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The New Dividend Puzzle
WILLIAM W. BRATrON*
INTRODUCTION
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (the "JGTRRA")'
aligns tax rates on shareholder capital gains and dividend income at a maximum
fifteen percent,2 departing from the classical rate preference for capital gains
and ameliorating the tax system's longstanding bias against dividends. 3 Accord-
ing to the JGTRRA's proponents, this adjustment will help jumpstart a stagger-
ing economy, jolt stock prices upward, and release a cascade of corporate cash
into the pockets of upscale consumers.4 Several high profile dividend increases
since the JGTRRA's enactment5 and an increase in the overall amount paid out
create an appearance of immediate success. Cooler heads point out that these
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Jesse Fried, Kim Krawiec,
Stuart Gillan, and the participants at Fordham Law School's Murphy Conference for their comments on
previous drafts of this Article. My thanks also to Michael Ingrassia and Elizabeth Glasgow for research
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1. Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
2. 1 MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & BUYOUTS T 108 (Dec. 2004
ed.).
3. For a review of the history, see Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining
Dividends? Evidence from History, 56 TAX L. REv. 463 (2003). Prior to the First World War,
corporations paid out their profits as dividends and financed projects with capital from outside. This
was partly due to the weakness of financial disclosure practice and partly due to illiquidity (trading
markets were thin or nonexistent). Id. at 471-74. Under early federal income tax regimes, dividends
were taxed at the corporate level only. Id. at 474-79. Payout practice changed with the advent of the
thick equity market and the separation of ownership and control-retained earnings increased at the
expense of dividend payments. Id. at 481-85. The regime of double tax emerged during the Depression
with management's support: the bias toward earnings retention suited management's desire for a wide
zone of discretion respecting finance and investment decisions. Id. at 516.
4. See, e.g., Greg Ip & John D. McKinnon, Bush's Tax Cut: Victory at a Cost, WALL ST. J., May 23,
2003, at A1; John D. McKinnon, The 2003 Tax Package: Tax Cut Embodies Political Agenda, WALL ST.
J., May 27, 2003, at A2.
5. See JENNIFER BLOUIN ET AL., DID DIVIDENDS INCREASE AFTER THE 2003 REDUCTION IN DIVIDEND TAX
RATES? 4 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10301, 2004), available at http:I/
www.nber.org/papers/w10301.pdf (reporting that dividend payments increased in quarter after the
enactment of the JGTRRA); RAI CHETY & EMMANUEL SAEz, DIVIDEND TAxES AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR:
EvmENCE FROM THE 2003 DIVIDEND TAX CUT 12 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10841, 2004) (showing a 20% increase in aggregate dividends in the six quarters following the tax cut);
Jeff D. Opdyke, Where To Look for Dividends, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 7, 2003, at D1; Joseph Weber et al.,
Dividends Are Simply Divine, Bus. WK., Mar. 1, 2004, at 96 (describing significant increases in
dividends at a number of firms).
The largest recent increase is the massive special dividend declared by Microsoft Corp. on July 21,
2004. Microsoft had a cash pile of $60 billion and had come under criticism for failure to invest or pay
out. Significantly, Microsoft is splitting the payout between a $32 billion dividend paid in December
2004 and a $30 billion, four-year open-market repurchase program. See Marcia Vickers, The Payout:
Any Dividend from the Microsoft Dividend?, Bus. WK., Aug. 2, 2004, at 47; Bill's Billions, Microsoft's
Dividend, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), July 24, 2004, at 14.
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increases fail to impress when viewed in historical context. 6 This Article joins
the cooler heads to predict that no fundamental shift in payout practice should
be expected in the wake of the JGTRRA.7 But it simultaneously enters a
governance objection: Corporate boards should take the occasion of the JGTRRA
to reconsider prevailing assumptions about payouts, in particular the relative
advantages of dividends and stock repurchases.
During the two decades preceding the JGTRRA, corporate boards steadily
moved away from the dividendS8-the traditional vehicle for distributing profits
to shareholders--diverting about half of the cash they distribute to shareholders
to open-market repurchases of their firms' own common stock ("OMRs"). The
shift seemed desirable for four reasons. First, OMRs offered the lower capital
gains rate to the selling shareholders, along with a tax deferral and the same
lower rate for nonselling shareholders. Second, OMRs increased earnings per
share by reducing the number of shares outstanding. Third, OMRs signaled
good news and supported the firm's stock price in the market. Fourth, because
OMRs suited management's preferences, they facilitated payout and reduced
the risk of suboptimal earnings retention. Old-fashioned dividends, in contrast,
carried a tax disadvantage for most shareholders, did nothing for earnings per
share, did less than OMRs to support the stock price, and overly constrained
cash flow management. Rate parity under the JGTRRA substantially removes
the first of the four justifications, inviting reconsideration of the emphasis
accorded the second, third, and fourth.
This Article moots the proposition that, given tax-rate parity under the
JGTRRA, 9 dividends could rise to relative superiority over repurchases for
shareholders of many firms. Prior to rate parity, straightforward reasoning
supported a preference for repurchases over dividends. Rate parity brings the
6. David Henry, Dividends Just Aren't Dazzling Enough, Bus. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 48 (pointing
out that the number of S&P 500 firms paying dividends in mid-2003, at 365, is still smaller than the 372
payers in 2000 and 438 payers in 1990, and that just 20% of the S&P firms have raised their dividends
as much as 10% in 2003 even as earnings have increased 17%); see also Weber et al., supra note 5, at
96 (noting that the amount of dividends declared by S&P 500 firms increased 8.8% in 2003, and the
number of S&P 500 firms declaring dividends increased by nineteen to 370, but primarily attributing
the increase to the firms' earnings increase of 28%).
The big winners in the recent bull market have been firms that pay no dividends at all. See Henry,
supra, at 48 (pointing out that S&P nonpayers' stocks were up 44% in 2003, while payers' stocks were
up 18%); Weber et al., supra, at 97 (noting that in 2003 the stock prices of dividend payers in the S&P
500 rose 23%, while those of nonpayers rose 54%).
7. Thus this Article seconds the suggestion of Bank, supra note 3, at 516-32.
8. This was the twentieth century's second structural shift away from dividends. The first occurred
prior to 1929. See Bank, supra note 3, at 481-85; see also MALCOLM BAKER & JEFFREY WURGLER,
APPEARING AND DISAPPEARING DIVIDENDS: THE LINK TO CATERING DIVIDENDS 12-16 (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9995, 2003) (using data on market-to-book-value ratios to show a
decrease in shareholder demand for dividends after 1978). In Baker and Wurgler's view, demand for
dividend decreases as investor demand for growth stocks increases. Id.
9. See I.R.C. §§ l(h)(1)(C), 1(h)(ll), 55(b)(3)(C) (West 2004). It should be noted that tax parity,
instituted by one Congress, cannot safely be assumed to be a permanent condition. Indeed, the
JGTRRA's regime of 15% parity is not permanent. It carries a sunset date of January 1, 2009. Id.
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relative advantages of dividends and OMRs into much closer balance, turning
the choice into a puzzle. In addition to tax-rate parity, four factors favor
dividends. First, dividends are transparent, but OMRs can fly under the radar of
the disclosure system. Second, dividends treat all shareholders equally, but
OMRs can divide shareholders into groups of winners and losers. Third,
dividends discipline managers, but OMRs augment management discretion
respecting the marginal dollar's payout. Fourth, repurchases help managers line
their own pockets by supporting the value of their stock options even as they
obscure the options' cost.
Corporate boards should confront the puzzle, reviewing payout policy de
novo and actively monitoring it on an ongoing basis. Unfortunately, in the
corporate governance system's present posture, boards are unlikely to confront
the puzzle, much less to attempt to solve it from the shareholder's point of view.
Managers retain a bias in favor of OMRs, stemming in part from their interest in
their own stock option compensation and from their dislike of the disciplinary
effect of dividends. Corporate and securities law inadvertently support this bias.
This Article asserts that the corporate governance system should follow the
JGTRRA in ameliorating the bias against dividends. To this end, it suggests that
payout policy be added to the growing list of subjects remitted to independent
director control.'o
The Article has five parts. Part I describes payout practice in the era of
shareholder capitalism, detailing the rise of repurchases from obscurity to
dollar-for-dollar parity with dividends in the late 1990s.
Part II evaluates two leading explanations for the shift to repurchases: tax
planning and signaling. Each of these explanations assumes benevolent manag-
ers who seek to maximize shareholder returns. But both explanations fail fully
to explain real-world practice and therefore fall short as justifications. The first
explanation, tax planning, should in theory determine the matter in a world of
differential rates. Arguably, it should continue to do so, for repurchases still
hold out a cognizable-albeit much reduced-tax benefit under the JGTRRA in
the form of a deferral of taxation of gains for long-term, nonselling sharehold-
ers. But, in practice, tax considerations influence payouts only marginally.
Managers making payout choices do not try to minimize shareholder income
taxes. Shareholders neither demand payouts keyed to their tax profiles nor sort
themselves into clearly delineated tax clienteles. Somewhat mysteriously, share-
holders have always registered an unshakeable demand for dividends, despite
the tax disadvantages. Part II continues by addressing the second explanation,
that repurchases add value as an informational signal. This idea follows from a
powerful body of financial theory, but it also fails as a primary explanation.
Stock prices increase so modestly in the wake of announcements of dividend
increases and OMR programs as to make it implausible that signaling by itself
10. For the stronger suggestion that repurchases should be prohibited, see Victor Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1046-49 (1975).
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motivates real-world managers. Both signals are so weak that neither supports
further inferences about hidden positive information. Signaling value accord-
ingly does not justify the shift to repurchases.
Part III considers an agency justification for the shift to repurchases, relaxing
the assumption that managers are benevolent. Under this view, repurchases
facilitate distribution of spare cash that otherwise might go to suboptimal
projects. Dividends are sticky; once a level of dividend payout is set, sharehold-
ers expect it to be maintained and treat dividend cuts as a signal of poor
performance. As a result, it is thought that firms with sporadic spare cash need
the flexibility of the repurchase alternative, with repurchases emerging as
superior to dividends as a matter of institutional practice in a world rife with
agency costs. Three countervailing considerations, however, undermine this
explanation. First, the shift to repurchases diminishes the disciplinary benefits
of dividends, complicating any justification based on agency theory. Second, the
shift to repurchases proceeded in tandem with the 1990s shift to stock option
compensation. Firms repurchased their stock to offset the negative and dilutive
effect of stock option exercises on their earnings per share. An OMR program's
value to long-term holders accordingly depends on the option plan's success as
incentive compensation. Third, sporadic free cash flows can be distributed as
dividends without triggering unjustified market expectations. Dividends do not
have to be sticky. Management need only draw on the practice of a half century
ago and declare a "special," as opposed to a "regular," dividend when it has
nonrecurring cash to distribute. The market will understand the distinction, and,
in sharp contrast to present practice, the resulting payout pattern will be
transparent.
Part IV takes up the claim that repurchases enhance the value of the firm
because managers systematically beat the market by executing repurchases at
bargain prices. Restating the claim in formal terms, an OMR program announce-
ment gives the firm an option to buy undervalued stock, and the option has a
value. The discussion highlights two shortcomings in the story. First, the
bargain repurchase possibility depends on the framework of market regulation.
Securities laws allow firms to time repurchases in secret, letting them take
advantage of market volatility. In a regime of imposed transparency, any
bargains for the most part would disappear. Second, management can be wrong
in viewing its stock as undervalued. To the extent that an OMR program sweeps
up overvalued stock, it benefits selling shareholders to the detriment of long-
term holders, who suffer dilution. This possibility mattered little under the
classical tax regime, because the tax benefit tended to make up for the dilution
risk. With rate parity, adverse selection becomes a more active possibility
respecting OMR programs. For a long-term holder, management's information
advantage imports no circumstantial guarantee against dilution due to over-
priced repurchases.
Part V sorts out the pluses and minuses. It asserts that the shift to repurchases
should not be read as a governance success story. Since repurchases offered tax
[Vol. 93:845
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benefits to most shareholders prior to the JGTRRA, there was no reason for
outside monitors to ask hard questions about flexibility and adverse selection or
to inquire further about the motivational effects of stock option valuation and
earnings management. With rate parity, the governance system needs to start the
questioning process. The bargain repurchase possibility must be weighed against
the adverse selection possibility, with the balance depending on the state of the
market. Taxation remains a consideration: repurchases and capital gains still
hold out deferral value for long-term, taxpaying shareholders. Finally, special
dividends present advantages of transparency with the possible spillover of
improved executive compensation policy. More generally, the JGTRRA poses a
cost-benefit puzzle to be solved firm by firm, case by case. Unfortunately, the
corporate governance system still rubber-stamps management payout decisions,
and will probably fail to confront the questions. Governance reform is needed to
assure that the payout decision is uncoupled from perverse incentives stemming
from stock option compensation and reformulated in light of tax parity. It
follows that payout should join management compensation in the emerging
regime of governance by independent-director committee.
I. THE SHIFT TO REPURCHASES
An OMR program takes the firm into the market as a buyer of its own stock.
The framework is flexible. Under the prevailing practice, the firm announces an
intention to repurchase its shares in the market, usually (1) stating a time period
over which it intends to act as a buyer, (2) stating an approximate number of
shares that it expects to repurchase, and (3) qualifying the foregoing statements
by stating that the number of shares actually repurchased will depend on market
conditions. Time periods for OMR programs tend to be long, ranging from
several months to several years. The average percentage of shares outstanding
targeted for buy-back is 6.6%." With no commitment to buy, the actual number
of shares repurchased can fall far short of the target figure. Estimated program
completion rates range between 53% and 72% of announced levels. 12 (The wide
range of uncertainty reflects the fact that, prior to 2004, firms were not required
to report separately the results of their OMR programs;' 3 statisticians trying to
ascertain completion rates have to rely on inferences from the lines in financial
statements impacted by repurchase activity.)
Alternatively, a firm desiring to buy back stock can make a repurchase tender
offer (RTO).14 In this mode, the firm publicly offers to its shareholders to
11. David L. Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases, 39 J. FIN.
ECON. 181, 185 (1995).
12. Murali Jagannathan et al., Financial Flexibility and the Choice Between Dividends and Stock
Repurchases, 57 J. FIN. EON. 355, 357 (2000) (reporting results for industrials between 1985 and
1996).
13. See infra note 87.
14. Most RTOs are structured as "Dutch auctions." Under this procedure, the corporation, instead of
announcing one price, announces a series of prices at which it is willing to repurchase shares.
2005]
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repurchase a set number of shares at a premium over the market price. The
shareholders decide whether or not to tender into the offer."5 The amount of
shares repurchased in RTOs averages about 15% of the number outstanding.
1 6
In practice, however, OMRs dominate RTOs by a wide margin: OMRs covered
92% of the stock specified by all announced repurchase programs between 1980
and 1999.17 Most of the RTOs were conducted during the restructuring era of
the late 1980s.' 8 OMRs, with their lower transaction costs and reduced commit-
ment, better serve the purpose of ongoing cash distribution and now dominate.
This Article accordingly addresses OMRs.
Prior to the mid-1980s, corporations only sporadically exercised their right to
repurchase their own shares.' 9 Payout practice has changed dramatically since
Shareholders interested in selling then submit offers stating the number of shares they desire to sell at
each of the stated prices. The corporation, having collected the offers, calculates the lowest single price
that yields the number of shares it desires to repurchase and accepts at that price the offers made at that
price and all lower prices. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 417-18, 441 n.4 (6th ed. 2000). The Dutch auction mode has emerged as the dominant RTO
practice because it tends to yield a lower overall purchase price. Jesse Fried, Insider Signaling and
Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 431-32 (2000), illustrates why:
ABC Corp. offers to repurchase 100 of its 200 shares for any price between $9 and $10. Fifty
shares are tendered at $9, 50 shares are tendered at $9.50, and 50 shares are tendered at $10.
ABC purchases 100 shares for $9.50. In a fixed price RTO at $10, ABC would attract 150
shares, and repurchase 100 for $10 each. Thus ABC Corp. would spend $50 (100 × $0.50)
more repurchasing the shares through the fixed price RTO.
An additional variation should be mentioned: the transferable put-rights distribution. Under this
arrangement, the firm distributes to the shareholders a right with a fixed term to sell shares back at a
specified price. Shareholders who do not exercise the option can trade their rights on a secondary
market. See RONALD C. LEASE ET AL., DIVIDEND POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON FIRM VALUE 159-60 (2000).
15. The time period is short; under the rules under section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the 1934 Act), the offer must be held open for at least twenty business days. See 15 U.S.C. §
78m(e) (2000).
16. Nikos Vafeas, Determinants of the Choice Between Alternative Share Repurchase Methods, 12 J.
AcCr. AUDITING & FIN. 101 (1997).
There is a third alternative. The corporation can negotiate in private to repurchase all or part of the
shares held by one or more shareholders. As a practical matter, the selling shareholders will hold large
blocks of stock, and the negotiated price will be at a premium over the market price. One subset of this
type of repurchase is "greenmail," where the seller accumulates the block in the open market and
threatens a takeover; the issuer then repurchases the block at a premium in order to defuse the takeover
threat. A tax penalty enacted in 1987 put an end to the practice. See I.R.C. § 5881 (2000).
17. Gustavo Grullon & David L. Ikenberry, What Do We Know About Stock Repurchases?, 13
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 31, 33-34 (2000); see also David L. Ikenberry & Theo Vermaelen, The Option to
Repurchase Stock, 25 FIN. MGMT. 9, 10 (1996). The percentage of repurchases completed through
OMRs is smaller than the percentage of announced purchases cited here but is impossible to calculate
exactly.
18. They tended to be highly leveraged and served a defensive function against takeovers. Jagan-
nathan et al., supra note 12, at 362.
19. American corporate law has long permitted corporations to repurchase their own shares.
Dewing, writing more than half a century ago, noted that legal capital rules permitted repurchases by
firms not in distress, and he described open-market repurchase programs conducted by cash-rich firms
taking advantage of low market prices during the Depression. See 1 ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 664-65 (5th ed. 1953).
Until recently, the United States was almost alone in the world in allowing repurchases. Id. at 665-66
[Vol. 93:845
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then. OMR activity became a constant feature of the corporate landscape in the
mid-1980s, taking a steadily growing share of dollars paid out. Today, OMRs
and dividends emerge as coequal modes of payout. This Part recounts the shift
in the payout pattern.
During the past three decades, the annual aggregate amount paid out to
shareholders by listed companies has held steady at 26% to 28% of annual
earnings. 20 But the portion paid out through repurchases has grown steadily. In
the period 1985 to 1996, the number of firms making OMR program announce-
ments increased over 650% from 115 per year to 755. The announced value of
the programs increased nearly 750% from $15.4 billion to $113 billion.2'
During the same period, annual dividends increased by a factor of two, going
from $67.6 billion to $141.7 billion. In 1972, repurchases amounted to 2.8% of
annual earnings; by 2000, repurchases had increased to 12.4% of earnings. In
contrast, annual dividends decreased from 21.4% of earnings in 1972 to 11.4%
in 2000.22 In 1980, thirteen cents were paid out annually for repurchases for
every dollar paid as dividend; by 2000, $1.13 went out for repurchases for every
dollar of dividends.23 In sum, repurchases achieved equal status with dividends
as a means of returning cash to equity investors; in hot stock markets, repur-
chases even surpassed dividends.
The dividend's relative decline occurred in tandem with a decline in the
proportion of publicly traded firms making any payout at all, whether through
dividends or repurchases. Consider these statistics: In 1978, 66.5% of nonfinan-
cial, nonutility listed companies paid dividends; in 1999 only 20.8% of these
firms paid dividends.24 The shift to repurchases did not cause the dividend
decline, however. The decline instead stemmed from an absolute rise in the
number of firms making no payout; by definition, these firms made no contribu-
n.dd (noting that in Britain repurchases were deemed a constructive fraud against creditors, while in
Canada repurchases were treated as illegal reductions of capital).
Repurchases by now are everyday events in Britain and Canada. David L. Ikenberry et al., Stock
Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading, 55 J. FIN. 2373 (2000); P. Raghavendra
Rau & Theo Vermaelen, Regulation, Taxes, and Share Repurchases in the United Kingdom, 75 J. Bus.
245 (2002). Elsewhere, in jurisdictions like Hong Kong, Japan, France, and Germany, legal barriers
have fallen in recent years. Ikenberry et al., supra, at 2373-74; Rau & Vermaelen, supra, at 246.
20. Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypoth-
esis, 57 J. FIN. 1649, 1656 (2002).
21. Jagannathan et al., supra note 12, at 356.
22. Grullon & Michaely, supra note 20, at 1656. Compare the results reported in Eugene Fama &
Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to
Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2001). In the period 1973-1977, aggregate repurchases were 3.37% of
aggregate earnings. This figure increased to 5.12% from 1978 to 1982. During the period 1983-1998,
repurchases constituted 31.42% of earnings. Id. at 35.
23. Grullon & Michaely, supra note 20, at 1649. From 1980 to 2000, amounts paid to repurchase
stock grew at an annual rate of 26.1%; amounts paid as dividends grew at 6.8% during the period. Id.
24. Fama & French, supra note 22, at 6. Dividend yields also shrank across the period, from 5.4% in
1980 to 1.1% in 2000 for companies in the S&P Index. H. Kent Baker, et al., Revisiting the Dividend
Puzzle: Do All of the Pieces Now Fit?, 11 RaV. FIN. ECON. 241, 254 (2002). Here rising stock prices
contribute to the dramatic numerical shift.
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tion to the rise in spending on repurchases. Restating this point, the growth in
repurchase activity came for the most part from within the shrinking class of
dividend-paying firms. From 1980 to 2000, 87.9% of total expenditures on
repurchases came from firms that also paid dividends.25 Even as these firms
maintained their overall payout rate at historic levels, they steadily adjusted the
relative proportions of dividends and repurchases in the latter's favor.26 This
class of paying firms includes larger, more profitable firms that tend to have
lower variability of return on assets. The nonpayers tend to be smaller, younger,
and less profitable companies that invest more capital relative to the amount of
earnings.27 These firms also have high ratios of market value to book value,
along with higher earnings volatility.
28
A small residual class, making up 12.1% of repurchasing firms, repurchases
without paying dividends. These firms tend to be larger and less volatile, like
the larger class of firms that both pay dividends and repurchase. As today's
nonpaying firms mature, this class of repurchase-only, nonpaying firms could
grow. A recent survey asked chief financial officers of nonpaying firms whether,
should their firms cross the line and join the ranks of payers, they would make
dividends, repurchases, or both. Two-thirds projected that they would opt to
repurchase, 27% projected that they would pay dividends, and 7% projected that
they would combine repurchases and dividends.29
II. BENEVOLENT MANAGERS AND RATIONAL SHAREHOLDERS: TAXATION AND
SIGNALING
It is axiomatic financial economic theory that, in a frictionless world with
investment policy held constant, payout policy has no consequences for share-
holder wealth. 30 Under this "irrelevance proposition," shareholders are indiffer-
ent as between dividends and OMRs.
25. Grullon & Michaely, supra note 20, at 1659. Firms that repurchase and pay no dividends
accounted for only 12.1% of repurchase activity during the period.
26. The rise in repurchases does not explain the fall-off in the overall proportion of dividend-paying
firms. Fama & French, supra note 22, at 6.
27. Fama & French, supra note 22, at 19. Fama and French find that even though the profiles of
dividend-paying firms and non-dividend-paying firms have remained constant across the period 1978-
1999, there is now a lower propensity to pay dividends regardless of firm characteristics. Controlling
for characteristics, firms that had never paid dividends initiated dividends at lower rates after 1978, and
former dividend payers have been less likely to resume. Id. at 8; see also Xiang Cai, Stock Repurchase
and Cash Acquisition-A Payout Policy Perspective (Jan. 27, 2005) (unpublished working paper draft),
at http://ssm.com/abstract=448000 (comparing the characteristics of repurchasing firms with those of
firms making acquisitions and finding that firms that repurchase and do not acquire have a lower
market-to-book-value ratio, a lower debt burden, higher return on assets, and higher cash flow).
28. Grullon & Michaely, supra note 20, at 1658.
29. See ALON BRAv ET AL., PAYOUT POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 11-12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9657, 2003) (forthcoming in J. FIN. ECON.).
30. See, e.g., Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961); Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AMER. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
(Vol. 93:845
THE NEW DIVIDEND PUZZLE
To see how theoretical irrelevance works, hypothesize a Firm X with N
shares outstanding. X spends Y dollars to repurchase its own shares at the
market price P, dollars that X otherwise would have devoted to a dividend
payment. The dividend is not cut completely; it is merely smaller than it
otherwise would have been. X's repurchases reduce its shares outstanding by a
percentage p = Y / (N * P). Since X would have paid out Y in its dividend but
for the repurchase, the repurchase implies a p percent cut in X's current
dividend yield, which falls on a percentage basis from d + p to merely d. The
shareholders make this back because the shift of payout p from dividend to
repurchase causes X's stock price to rise p percent.3' The stock price goes up
because the number of shares outstanding declines, offsetting the effect of the
dividend cut and leaving the total value accruing to X's continuing shareholders
unaffected.32 Thus the choice between dividend and repurchase is irrelevant in
theory.
Filling in some numbers, assume that at the starting point, X is worth $1
million and has $20,000 in cash to distribute above that $1 million. X has
10,000 shares outstanding, which are trading for $100. If the $20,000 is paid as
a dividend, the shareholders receive $2 per share. If X repurchases 100 shares
for $100 each with $10,000 and pays the remaining $10,000 out as a dividend,
p = $10,000 / (10,000 * $100) = 1%. The stock price will rise 1% after the
repurchase: $1,000,000/9900 shares outstanding = $101. The shareholders are
in the same position, holding a total of $102, whether the $20,000 is paid out by
dividend or repurchase.
The irrelevance proposition holds only in theory and does not describe
real-world practice. Nonetheless, it strongly influences explanations and justifi-
cations of observed financial techniques and institutions.33 Such explanations
use the irrelevance proposition as a starting point, then identify a real-world
friction and show how the friction causes a financial practice that is irrelevant in
theory to enhance value to the benefit of real-world actors. This Part inspects
two explanations of repurchases: tax planning and signaling. To the extent that
either explanation persuasively shows that repurchases place value on the table,
the shift to repurchases is not only explained, but justified. We will see that
neither explanation, however, proves adequate; both fail to justify the full extent
of the payout shift.
31. Restating, on the ex-dividend date in the year in question, X's stock will fall by d percent rather
than by d + p percent. J. NELLIE LANG & STEVEN A. SHARPE, SHARE REPURCHASES AND EMPLOYEE STOCK
OPTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR S&P 500 SHARE RETIREMENTS AND EXPECTED RETURNS 3 (Fed.
Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 1999-59, 1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/
1999/199959/199959pap.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance Theory,
74 S. CAL. L. REv. 179, 179-80 (2000).
2005]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
A. TAXATION-SUBSTITUTION AND CLIENTELES
Return to Firm X and assume, for simplicity, that the tax system treats
dividends as ordinary income at a 50% marginal rate and taxes long-term
capital gains at a 25% rate. Further assume that all of X's shareholders pay
income taxes and hold for more than a year before selling their shares. X's
decision to pay out $10,000 by repurchase results in a net tax savings to its
shareholders.34 A $20,000 dividend implies $10,000 of income tax to the
shareholders in the year of payout. The shift to $10,000 of dividend and
$10,000 for repurchase triggers less than $7500 of taxes in the year of payout:
$5000 with respect to the dividend, along with capital gains tax with respect to
the selling shareholders in amounts determined by their bases and not exceeding
$2500 (the aggregate tax payable in the unlikely event that all the selling
shareholders have bases of zero). The continuing shareholders, meanwhile, see
the stock rise $1 per share without a current taxable event; they benefit from a
deferral of tax on the gain until they sell X stock and from any later capital-gains-
rate shift respecting the sales. Assume the discount rate is 10%, and all
continuing shareholders hold for five years. The $9900 of present gain in X's
market capitalization triggers $2475 of capital gains tax in five years. The
negative present value of that tax is $1534.50; accordingly, the present value of
the deferral is $940.50.
The JGTRRA changes the tax ramifications of X's choice between dividends
and repurchases without completely denuding repurchases of their tax benefit.
With a $20,000 dividend, the shareholders pay $3000 in tax. A fifty-fifty split
between dividend and repurchase means $1500 in present income tax and a
maximum of $1500 in capital gains tax. Rate parity does not imply equal tax
payments for all: To the extent the shareholders selling into the repurchase have
bases higher than zero, they pay less than $1500 in capital gains tax with respect
to their sales.3 5 In addition, the nonselling shareholders still benefit from a
deferral on the $1-per-share rise in the value of the stock. Once again assuming
a 10% discount rate and a five-year holding period, the $9900 present gain
triggers $1485 in future tax. The negative present value of that outflow is
$920.70 and the value of the deferral is $564.30. The value of the deferral
34. This treatment results when the corporation uses OMRs. The distribution is treated as a sale or
exchange only if the reduction in the selling shareholder's ownership in the firm is significant. Under a
safe harbor, dividend treatment is avoided if the shareholder completely terminates participation or if
the repurchase is substantially disproportionate among the shareholders. See I.R.C. § 302(b) (2000);
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (as amended in 1997). An OMR is disproportionate because only random
selling shareholders take the payout; a pro-rata redemption of a percentage of an issue of common stock
would be treated as a dividend.
35. In addition, to the extent the selling shareholders can balance capital gains on X stock with other
capital losses during the same period, the repurchase benefits them by offering a source of gains for
matching purposes. Of course, these shareholders can sell X so as to generate gains for matching
purposes whether or not X repurchases-they may avoid paying taxes on the dividend at ordinary
income rates by selling before the ex-dividend date and thereby picking up a part of the value of the
dividend in capital gains form.
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declines with the tax rate ($940.50 at 25% versus $564.30 at 15%), but remains
cognizable regardless.
These profiles suggest unchanging tax advice respecting payout practice,
whether as of 1960, 1980, 1990, or 2005: Rational managers and shareholders
should agree to channel payouts to repurchases, avoiding dividends to the
maximum amount tolerated by the tax system. Cognizable, albeit much re-
duced, tax benefits continue to follow from repurchase under the JGTRRA.
This dollars-and-cents tax advice falls short as an historical explanation for
the shift to repurchases, however. The discussion that follows shows that, in
practice, shareholder tax effects do not loom large as subjective motivations in
corporate boardrooms. Nor, viewed objectively, does the overall payout pattern
appear to be tax-driven. If tax concerns did not drive payout practice prior to the
JGTRRA, they are unlikely to motivate firms and shareholders under rate parity.
1. Substitution Theory
The 1990s shift to repurchases moved the tax profile of corporate payouts in
the correct, lower-tax direction. One school of thought, called "substitution
theory," uses this point to explain the repurchase boom as a rational response to
the tax system:3 6 because, under the irrelevance hypothesis, dividends and
repurchases are perfect substitutes for one another, a real-world decision to
repurchase implies a benevolent manager seeking to maximize the shareholders'
after-tax returns. To review the last three decades of payout policy, then, is to
see managers riding up a learning curve, shaking off irrational traditions to
"substitute" repurchases for dividends and move the practice in an optimal
direction.
Taxes unquestionably impact payout policy at some level.a7 Many empirical
studies show evidence of this sensitivity.3 Moreover, firms have "substituted"
36. See, e.g., Laurie S. Bagwell & John B. Shoven, Cash Distributions to Shareholders, 3 J. ECON.
PERSP. 129, 130, 137 (1989); Grullon & Michaely, supra note 20.
37. A very clear case occurred in the United Kingdom in 1997. From 1973 to 1997, the UK tax
system required issuers to pay tax in advance on dividends and issued a tax credit to shareholders with
respect to dividends. In the case of tax-exempt investors, the useless tax credit could be exchanged for a
full cash refund. As a result, tax-exempt institutions and funds had a strong preference for dividends
over earnings retention. The refund was withdrawn in 1997. This had the effect of reducing the value of
dividends to tax-exempt shareholders by 20%. Price studies show a consequent reduction in the market
value of dividend income (based on the stock price's downward movement on the ex-dividend date),
especially for high yield companies. See Leonie Bell & Tim Jenkinson, New Evidence of the Impact of
Dividend Taxation and on the Identity of the Marginal Investor, 52 J. FIN. 1321, 1322-24 (2002).
38. The principal literature looks to stock price movement on the ex-dividend date. In theory, the
stock will drop on the record date for a declared dividend in an amount equal to the dividend, because
purchasers after the date will not receive the payment. In practice, the stock drops in an amount less
than the dividend. The empirical tests seek to show that the price decline is net of the dividend's tax
cost. Unfortunately for substitution theory, the results are inconclusive. See H. Kent Baker et al.,
Revisiting the Dividend Puzzle: Do All of the Pieces Now Fit?, 11 REV. FIN. ECON. 241, 243-44, 255
(2002).
Grullon and Michaely, supra note 20, produce three sets of statistical results that show the influence
of tax and substitution: (1) They compare sets of firms making OMR announcements before and after
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repurchases for dividends in a practical sense. Dividend payers and repurchasers
are the same firms for the most part, and these finns' aggregate payout rates
have remained constant for three decades even as repurchases have made up a
steadily increasing percentage.39
The question, however, is whether substitution theory provides a complete or
even a primary explanation for the observed payout pattern. A number of factors
limit its explanatory reach. First, if the market capitalizes the value of invest-
ments net of the tax consequences of payouts (and a cognizable body of opinion
in financial economics asserts that it does), it follows that managers need not
worry much about shareholder tax consequences when making payout deci-
sions.4° Second, the timing is off. Why did tax considerations not motivate
management differently decades ago? 4' And why did the move to repurchase
start to pick up steam in the mid-1980s, just when Congress enacted the Tax
Reform Act of 1986?42 The 1986 Act eliminated the capital gains rate prefer-
ence for a brief period, lessening the shareholder tax preference for repurchases
over dividends. 43 From a tax point of view, this was an odd time for manage-
ment to take the first steps toward repurchase. Substitution works well only in
ahistorical models. In the real world, it seems improbable that it would take
management twenty-five years to figure out how to take advantage of the rate
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to see if the market responses at announcement differ. They did-the
announcement period uptick was 3.49% before the Act and 2.42% after the Act. Id. at 1674. (2) Grullon
and Michaely also compare the negative market price response to 1,255 dividend-cut announcements
made from 1974-1996 by two sets of firms-firms paying only a dividend and firms paying dividends
and repurchasing. The dividend-only firms' stock dropped an average of 1.93% and the dividend/
repurchase firms' stock dropped an average of 0.45%. Without substitution, argue Grullon and Michaely,
the two groups would have similar numbers. Id. at 1668-72. (3) Finally, Grullon and Michaely use the
Lintner model of dividend payout pattern to project a rate of dividend increase and then test to see if
deviations from the pattern are negatively related to repurchase activity. They find greater forecast error
for firms also making repurchases, implying that the firms siphon money from dividends to repur-
chases. Id. at 1655.
39. See supra text accompanying note 21.
40. See Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, 50 J. FIN.
1, 19 (2000). It is noted that this view still holds out the possibility that management could enhance the
rate of return on its equity by taking advantage of a tax benefit. Meenakshi Sinha et al., Payout Policy
and the Cost of Capital 2, 4-6 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished first draft), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=620382,
reports that dividend-paying firms have a lower cost of equity capital, falsifying a long-mooted view
that such firms' cost of equity capital would rise to make up for the payout.
41. Grullon & Michaely, supra note 20, at 1652.
42. Jagannathan et al., supra note 12, at 367. Erik Lie & Heidi J. Lie, The Role of Personal Taxes in
Corporate Decisions: An Empirical Analysis of Share Repurchases and Dividends, 34 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 533, 539 (1999), show a residual element of tax sensitivity. It seems that after
1986, within the group of companies that restructured by making large cash payments to their
shareholders, there was a shift away from RTOs, which held out capital gains treatment, to large special
dividends, resulting in ordinary income treatment.
43. See Eric M. Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Disequilib-
rium, 66 N.C. L. REv. 839, 854-55 (1988). The tax disincentive for dividends persisted for many firms
because corporate tax preferences lowered the firms' marginal rates relative to the personal rate. See
Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325,
357-59 (1995).
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shift and deferral held out by the tax system. Third, the payout record since
1990 does not indicate that managers substitute, in the direct sense of transform-
ing a dollar of dividends into a dollar for repurchase, for the purpose of
delivering a tax advantage to shareholders. If that were the case, managers
would freeze, reduce, or eliminate their firms' dividends so as to enhance the tax
advantage even more. Instead, they let their dividends rise, protecting an
antecedent level of payment and using repurchases to pay out increments of
cash above the set level.44
Shareholder tax returns do not loom large as subjective motivators when
corporate actors make payout decisions. Although surveys show that managers
are well aware of the tax implications of payouts and recognize tax advantage as
a factor in favor of repurchases, in a 2002 survey, only 21.4% of CFOs of
dividend-paying firms cited tax as an important factor, along with only 28.6% of
the CFOs of repurchasing firms. A majority of the same group represented that
tax does not influence decisions regarding levels of dividends or the choice
between dividends and repurchases. When the CFOs of dividend-paying firms
were asked where the money would go if the firm cut its dividend, the most
popular answer was debt repayment. Share repurchase came in second.45
The same survey asked a group of CFOs of dividend-paying firms whether
the JGTRRA would cause a shift in their policies. Two-thirds said elimination
of the tax burden on dividends would definitely or probably not affect their
decisions; one-quarter said it might lead to a dividend increase; only 6% said it
definitely would lead to an increase. Among a group of CFOs of firms that use
neither dividends nor repurchases, only 1% said their firm would definitely start
paying dividends in response to the JGTRRA; 16% said their firm probably
would start paying dividends in response, while 82% said they either definitely
or probably would not.
46
It remains to be seen whether these representations prove predictive of
post-JGTRRA payout practice.47 Substitution theory, while not a primary expla-
nation of past practice, still could come into play.48 But, given the reduction in
44. Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 17, at 10.
45. See BRAv Er AL., supra note 29, at 18-19. Earlier surveys report similar results. See, e.g., H. Kent
Baker & George E. Powell, How Corporate Managers View Dividend Policy, 38 Q.J. Bus. & ECON. 17
(1999) (reporting that management is unsure of the cogency of the tax explanation); J.W. Wansley et al.,
Management's View on Share Repurchase and Tender Offer Premiums, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1989, at
97, 106 (supporting signaling theory but not substitution).
Survey evidence carries more weight with respect to payout policy than it does elsewhere in financial
economics. For example, the touchstone paper in the entire literature, John Lintner, Distributions of
Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes, Am. EcoN. Rav., May 1956,
at 97, presents the results of a survey. The Lintner picture remains generally accepted.
46. BRAv ET AL., supra note 29, at 9.
47. Early returns show an increase in the number of firms raising or initiating a dividend in 2003.
See Ken Brown, As Taxes Fall Dividends Rise-And Executives Reap Big Gains, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11,
2003, at Al; sources cited supra note 5.
48. James Poterba, Taxation and Corporate Payout Policy, 94 Am. ECON. REV. 171 (2004), presents
a time-series model that relates a measure of average investor tax preferences to the rate of dividend
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the tax penalty on dividends, the substitution could very well work the other
way.
2. Clientele Theory
Substitution theory posits that management caters to shareholder tax prefer-
ences-unconvincingly. A competing "clientele theory" posits that shareholders
do not wait around for dispensations of corporate grace and instead take care of
their own problems. Under this view, shareholders sort themselves among
different firms in accordance with their different tax postures and the firms'
policies. Firms in turn will attract different groups of shareholders depending on
their payout practices. Tax-exempt holders will gravitate to high dividend firms,
while taxpaying holders will gravitate to firms that make no payouts or favor
repurchases. A negative implication for substitution theory follows: To the
extent shareholders sort themselves into clienteles, managers should not try to
do them a tax favor by adjusting payout policy. Any sudden shifts in the pattern
could disturb existing shareholders' expectations, adversely affecting the stock
price. And it appears that managers do worry about consistent payout patterns
and shareholder expectations.49
The clientele description makes sense but direct empirical confirmation stops
there. We emerge with tax clienteles that amount to less of a defining geography
of shareholding than a vague behavioral tendency.50 The best evidence of the
tendency comes from studies that focus on retail shareholder portfolios and
trading records.5 ' It appears that older and poorer retail investors tend toward
high dividend yield stocks; as income tax liability is marginally less important
to holders with these profiles, the finding confirms a clientele effect.52 Most
clientele studies are indirect, however. They test the proposition that, given
clienteles, a dividend increase will be greeted more positively at a firm with a
low-tax clientele than it will at firm with a high-tax clientele. The studies
confirm the prediction, but only inferentially. Firms do not possess shareholder
lists breaking out tax profiles. The tester accordingly assumes that a dividend
increase will be more favorably received at a firm with a track record for high
dividend payouts, on the assumption that the shareholders already will have
payout, to produce a measure of the long-run elasticity of dividend payout to investor tax preference.
The model shows positive elasticity and suggests that the JGTRRA will have a long-run positive impact
on dividends. Id. at 173-74. The results show higher elasticity for the period including the 1990s than
did the results of an earlier study of the period 1935-1985. Poterba aptly notes that this is surprising in
view of the proliferation of OMRs after 1985. Id. at 174.
49. BRAY ET AL., supra note 29, at 13-14.
50. See Mitchell L. Engler, A Missing Piece of the Dividend Puzzle: Agency Costs of Mutual Funds,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 226 (2003) (contending that clientele theory inadequately explains the
dividend level over time).
51. John Graham & Alok Kumar, Do Dividend Clienteles Exist? Evidence on the Dividend Prefer-
ences of Retail Investors (Nov. 3, 2003), at httpJ/ssm.com/abstract=482563 (summarizing the literature).
52. Id. at 5-18.
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sorted themselves into a clientele, which is of course the point to be proved.53
Contrasting stock price studies find that changes in dividend payout rates do not
cause changes in clienteles. 4
Clientele theorists also focus on the presence of institutional investors.
55
These theorists can detect institutions among a firm's stockholders, and institu-
tions have common characteristics admitting of a clientele characterization. The
problem is that there is no agreement on the critical question whether institu-
tions prefer dividends to repurchases or vice versa. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Skinner, in a leading paper, cite rising institutional ownership as the primary
cause for the decades-long shift from dividends to repurchases. Repurchases,
they assert, came along just as institutional owners gained majority status
among shareholders; since institutional holders are smarter than retail holders,
their presence encouraged a shift to payout policy that favors better informed
investors.56 Other studies show a statistical correlation between institutional
holders and repurchasing firms and suggest that institutions prefer firms that
repurchase.57 But there is noise on this clientele screen. Still other studies show
that firms that increase payouts, whether by dividend or repurchase, have higher
institutional ownership than firms that do not pay out, and that within the group
of payout-increasing firms, firms that pay no dividends and only make repur-
chases have the lowest level of institutional ownership, while dividend-
increasing firms have the highest level of institutional ownership. 8 It also
53. Lie & Lie, supra note 42, at 535, 543. That is, the tests assume that the differing tax rates of the
different clienteles are reflected in the stock price on the date of the dividend event. For a study in this
mode, see Mukesh Bajaj & Anand M. Vijh, Dividend Clienteles and the Information Content of
Dividend Changes, 26 J. FIN. EcoN. 193 (1990) (finding that high-yield stocks have stronger price
reactions to dividend changes); see also Harry DeAngelo et al., Special Dividends and the Evolution of
Dividend Signaling, 57 J. FIN. EcoN. 309 (2000) (supporting the finding of a positive relationship).
Other studies investigate the phenomenon of excess trading volume on the ex-dividend date. By
hypothesis, tax-disadvantaged shareholders sell to tax-advantaged shareholders. See R. Michaely & J.
Vila, Trading Volume with Private Valuation: Evidence from the Ex-Dividend Day, 9 REv. FIN. STUD.
471 (1996) (showing that excess trading on ex-days increases in proportion to tax heterogeneity); Dan
Dhaliwal & Oliver Zhen Li, Investor Tax Heterogeneity and Ex-Dividend Day Trading Volume-The
Effect of Dividend Yield and Institutional Ownership (Nov. 19, 2004) (unpublished working paper), at
http://ssm.com/abstract = 450043 (same).
54. See B. Espen Eckbo & Savita Verna, Managerial Shareownership, Voting Power, and Cash
Dividend Policy, 1 J. CORP. FIN. 33 (1994); see also Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., A Test of the Theory of Tax
Clienteles for Dividend Policies, 52 NAT'L TAx J. 179, 180 (1999) (noting that the studies show some
evidence of clienteles but nothing conclusive).
55. Poterba, supra note 48, at 171, reports that taxable household ownership accounted for 80% of
outstanding stock in the late 1960s, declined to 60% by the late 1980s, and to 57% by 2003.
56. Harry DeAngelo et al., supra note 53, at 352-53.
57. Eli Bartov et al., Evidence on How Companies Choose Between Dividends and Open-Market
Stock Repurchases, II J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 89 (1998) (studying 280 firms, half paying dividends and
half doing OMRs); see also Franklin Allen et al., A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles, 60 J.
FIN. 2499 (2000) (presenting a theoretical model tying an institutional-repurchase clientele to gover-
nance discipline).
58. Jagannathan et al., supra note 12, at 375, 377.
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seems that institutions prefer dividend-payers to non-dividend-payers 59 and that
institutional ownership significantly increases when firms initiate dividends. 6°
Management survey data tracks these confusing results. CFOs tend to assume
that dividend payout rates matter for both retail stock and institutional stock
selections, but that repurchase activity matters only for institutions.6'
The conflicting signals respecting institutions may stem from the institutions'
differing tax postures. Pension funds are tax-exempt. Dividends paid to mutual
funds flow through to their holders' tax returns; 62 according to some observers,
the funds are insensitive to the shareholder tax effects of their portfolio manage-
ment decisions. 63 Different institutions, moreover, will have different invest-
ment objectives. A growth fund will be less attracted to dividends than a value
fund. Finally, some institutions are subject to regulatory constraints that steer
them to dividend-paying stocks. 64
3. Summary: The Dividend Puzzle
Taxation is the logical place to start the search for explanations and justifica-
tions for corporate payout policy, for, as we have seen, it bears significantly on
financial yields to shareholders. The results of empirical studies support its
relevance, but they do not sustain a place for taxation as a primary explanation.
This stands to reason. If tax were the driving factor here, taxpaying shareholders
would have clamored for substitution of dividends by repurchases decades ago.
Alternatively, shareholder sorting among firms in accordance with their tax
postures would have produced clear-cut clienteles.
The fact that neither tax-driven result has been demonstrated, even as share-
holders have paid incremental taxes on dividends with apparent equanimity,
creates a puzzle much discussed in financial economics: the original dividend
puzzle.65 It seems that some shareholders are so attached to their dividends that
59. Yaniv Grinstein & Roni Michaely, Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy, AM. FIN. Ass'N
2003 WASH., D.C., MEETINGS, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=308870, cited in Graham & Kumar,
supra note 51 (finding that institutions prefer dividend-paying stocks with low yields to those with high
yields).
60. Dhaliwal & Lie, supra note 53.
61. More particularly, half of the CFOs thought dividends were important to retail and institutional
investors, but only 20% thought repurchases were important to retail investors. See BRAv ET AL., supra
note 29.
62. Funds avoid fund-level taxes on trading gains by distributing all gains to their shareholders; the
shareholders are taxed even if they reinvest all distributions in the fund. See I.R.C. §§ 851-852 (West
Supp. 2004).
63. See Engler, supra note 50, at 229-31 (pointing out that mutual funds hold and trade short-term
despite the tax disadvantages to taxpaying shareholders).
64. Some firms maintain a trivial payout-a couple of cents per share-so that such institutions are
not disabled from holding the stock. See BRAv ET AL., supra note 29.
65. See Fischer Black, The Dividend Puzzle, 2 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5 (1976). For recent review and
reconsideration of the dividend puzzle, see Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Payout Policy and the
Dividend Puzzle (Mar. 2004) (unpublished working paper), at http://ssm.comlabstract=528704. DeAn-
gelo and DeAngelo return the inquiry to fundamentals, focusing on the base point that shareholder
value presupposes payout and its sensitivity to the payout of free cash flow.
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they forego tax advantages. It also seems that they prefer managers to maintain
present levels of dividends even if so doing causes the firm to pass up promising
opportunities, defined as investments holding out a rate of return r greater than
the firm's percentage cost of equity capital k.66 This shareholder preference for
dividends appears irrational.67 There results a daunting explanatory task for
economists, dedicated as they are to rational expectations explanations of
financial phenomena.
Meanwhile, two propositions emerge. First, something other than shareholder
taxation shapes the management preferences that determine payouts. Second,
although tax-driven shareholder sorting does occur, significant numbers of
shareholders like their dividends despite the tax penalty. 68 Under the new
regime of rate parity, these shareholders could prefer a shift back to dividends
and away from repurchases.
B. SIGNALING
Recall that, under the irrelevance hypothesis, it makes no difference to
shareholders whether a firm makes a payout by dividend or repurchase, at least
in a frictionless world in which managers only invest in projects holding out a
rate of return r higher than the firm's cost of capital k. Now hypothesize a firm
seeking to fund such an r > k investment. The firm has a choice: It can either
cut the dividend to release the necessary cash or raise the cash from outside
sources. Under the irrelevance hypothesis, the choice makes no difference and
the shareholders are indifferent. If management cuts the dividend, a shareholder
desiring current income can make her own dividend, selling a portion of her
stockholding, which will have risen in price to reflect the value added by the
new investment.69 If management does not cut the dividend, the firm still can
66. For further explanation of these behavior patterns, see infra text accompanying notes 100-03,
107-10.
67. See, e.g., Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, A Catering Theory of Dividends, 59 J. FIN. 1125,
1132-35, 1142-47 (2004) (discussing the shareholder preference for dividends in the context of a study
showing a market-to-book premium for dividend-paying firms prior to 1978).
68. A simple tax analysis predicts that shares paying high dividends should pay a premium, since the
returns that matter are after tax. The empirical studies do not bear out the prediction, showing no
distinction between high- and low-dividend shares. See LEASE Er AL., supra note 14, at 66, 69.
69. See Miller & Modigliani, supra note 30. The relaxation of the assumption of a taxless world
causes the prediction to change, however. As we have seen, the Internal Revenue Code, prior to the
JGTRRA, included a bias against dividends, taxing them at ordinary income rates in a regime under
which retained earnings effectively resulted in tax deferral and a downward shift to capital gains rates.
Assuming r > k investments (that is, investments with a rate of return greater than the cost of equity
capital), a dividend injures a taxpaying shareholder. The prescription changes slightly for finns with
free cash flow-that is, internally generated cash in excess of the cost of the set of r > k investments.
These monies should be paid out of the firm, but the taxpaying shareholder with a long-term holding
perspective will prefer an OMR program. Add all of this up, and there emerges a rule of thumb
respecting sources of capital for new r > k investments. The first choice is retained earnings, since they
carry the lowest transaction costs, and retention avoids the taxable event of a dividend payment. The
second choice is debt, since interest payments can be deducted as a business expense. New equity
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finance the investment by selling more stock. 70 The dilution effect of the new
equity financing will be offset by the increase in value stemming from the new
investment, leaving the shareholders in the same place the dividend cut left
them. Given this theoretical irrelevance, both the dividend itself and the fact
that real-world managers never cut dividends in order to fund good investments
need explaining.7
Economists look to real-world frictions to explain the shareholders' attach-
ment to sustained dividends. One prominent school of thought looks to the
information asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders and posits
that payout decisions signal hidden information about the firm's prospects,
information that could not credibly be communicated by any other means.
72
Dividend cuts can signal either good or bad news: either earnings will be
declining in the future and the firm is husbanding cash, or the firm has excellent
new investments and needs cash to fund them.7 3 Shareholders assume the worst;
managers therefore avoid dividend Cuts. 7 4 In contrast, payout increases can
signal hidden favorable information about the firm's prospects. Whether the
payout is by dividend or repurchase, the underlying good news could be any of
the following: (1) earnings will improve in the future, (2) the stock is underval-
ued on the market, (3) management will reduce agency costs, or (4) the payout
will increase the firm's ratio of debt to equity so as to reduce the amount paid
comes in last. For a theoretical model of this "pecking order" proposition, see Stewart C. Myers, The
Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575 (1984).
70. The firm can also borrow. Under the irrelevance hypothesis, the shareholders are in the same
place net of the cost of the borrowing.
71. This is another piece of the "dividend puzzle." See Fischer Black, The Dividend Puzzle, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1976, at 5. Firms routinely raise outside capital for r > k investments in the
same period in which they pay out cheaper investment capital to their shareholders. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 650-51 (1984).
72. This hypothesis finds formal expression in a number of models. See, e.g., Sudipto Bhattacharya,
Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy, 10 BELL J. EON. 259
(1979) (showing that when outside investors have imperfect information about firms' profitability,
dividends function as a signal of expected cash flow); Bhagwan Chowddry & Vikram Nanda, Repur-
chase Premia as a Reason for Dividends: A Dynamic Model of Corporate Payout Policies, 7 REv. FIN.
STUD. 321 (1994) (showing that when the difference between intrinsic value and market value is small,
management only needs a small signal and uses a dividend, but when the value-price disparity is great,
management uses the more expensive RTO); Kose John & Joseph Williams, Dividends, Dilution, and
Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium, 40 J. FIN. 1053 (1985) (showing that in a world of insiders and
outsiders dividends can only be expected when the insiders have favorable inside information); Merton
H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN. 1031 (1985)
(showing a signaling equilibrium in which the market price rises less than the insiders' information
would justify); Aharon R. Ofer & Anjan V. Thakor, A Theory of Stock Price Responses to Alternative
Corporate Cash Disbursement Methods: Stock Repurchases and Dividends, 42 J. FIN. 365 (1987)
(showing that when the difference between intrinsic value and market value is small, management only
needs a small signal and uses a dividend, but when the value-price disparity is great, management uses
the more expensive RTO).
73. See WILLIAM W. BRATrON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 561-62 (5th ed. 2002).
74. See infra text accompanying note 81.
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out in corporate income taxes.75 A payout by repurchase creates two additional
informational possibilities, either that (1) management wants the shareholders to
benefit from a decrease in dividend taxation, or (2) management's presence as a
buyer in the market will enhance the liquidity of the stock.
Whatever the more particular informational content, if payout increases
convey positive signals not otherwise communicable, they enhance shareholder
value. The stock price moves in the correct direction more quickly than would
have been the case without the signal. The reduction in the cost of information
reduces the firm's cost of equity capital, also causing the stock price to rise, all
other things being equal.7 6 The signaling hypothesis accordingly supplies both
an explanation and a justification for payout policy.
Stock price studies show that the market does indeed perceive informational
content in payout announcements. The testers look for extraordinary returns in
the days surrounding announcements. Their findings reveal a content hierarchy.
RTOs take the top spot, triggering abnormal gains ranging from 8% to 12%.
OMRs are in the middle, with an average market price increase of 3.0% to
3.5%, depending on the study.78 Dividend increases lie at the bottom, triggering
an average 1% price uptick79 (with the opposite result for a dividend cut,
averaging 6%).80
The RTO signal is strongest because the announcement entails a short-term
commitment to repurchase at a premium over the market price-a premium
customarily higher than the post-announcement gain.81 Since management com-
75. See Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs
(Nov. 2002) (unpublished working paper), at http://ssrn.con/abstract=206328.
76. See Ok-Rial Song, Hidden Social Costs of Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 J. CoRP. L. 425,
447 (2002).
77. See Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, The Relative Signaling Power of Dutch-Auction and
Fixed Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases, 46 J. FLN. 1243, 1246 (1991).
More particularly, the result is 11.9% for fixed-price RTOs and 7.7% for Dutch auctions. Id.
78. David L. Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases, 39 J. FIN.
ECON. 181 (1995), looks at OMRs from 1980 to 1990 and reports 3.42%. Grullon & Michaely, supra
note 75, looks at a large sample, from 1980 to 1994, and reports a median of 2.94%. Ikenberry &
Vermaelen, supra note 17, at 17-18, using the 1980-1990 sample, add that as the percentage of shares
covered by the OMR announcement goes up from 2.5% to 4.5% to 10%, the price reaction rises from
2.63% to 4.40%. All of the OMR studies exclude the fourth quarter of 1987, when issuers, with the
encouragement of the SEC, conducted hasty and substantial OMR programs in the wake of the stock
market crash.
79. See, e.g., Joseph Aharony & Itzhak Swary, Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements
and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J. FiN. 1 (1980); Paul Asquith & David Mullins,
The Impact of Initiating Dividends Payments on Shareholders' Wealth, 56 J. Bus. 77 (1983); DeAngelo
et al., supra note 53, at 344; see also Richard Leftwich & Mark Zmijewski, Contemporaneous
Announcements of Dividends and Earnings, 9 J. AcCr. AuDrmi & FiN. 725 (1994) (asserting that
dividends have informational content when firms reveal good news about earnings and bad news about
dividends).
80. See David Denis et al., The Information Content of Dividend Changes: Cash Flow Signaling,
Overinvestment, and Dividend Clienteles, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 567 (1994). For further
discussion, see infra note 100-03.
81. For all RTOs, 1979 to 1989, the median undervaluation prior to the event was 30%, the median
premium was 21%, and the median announcement price reaction was 12.1%. See Ranjan D'Mello &
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mits a substantial and verifiable amount of cash, an RTO usually implies that
management deems the firm's intrinsic value to be substantially higher than its
stock price. Usually, but not always: the positive signal is credible only when
the managers do not tender into the offer and are not threatened by a hostile
takeover. In these cases the cash payout amounts to a bet on the firm's future
prospects. 82 About three-quarters of RTO firms turn out to be undervalued in the
antecedent stock market; the rest are overvalued. Distinguishing the underval-
ued majority from the overvalued minority does not prove difficult, given
disclosure of management trading. In the years preceding the RTO, insiders of
undervalued firms are net buyers in the market, and insiders of overvalued firms
are net sellers in the market, with the trading trend becoming more pronounced
in the six months before the announcement.
83
The OMR signal is more equivocal-so equivocal as to bring signaling into
question both as an explanation and as a justification for OMRs. The average
3% abnormal announcement return yielded by the studies does not impress with
its magnitude; three percent is not much more than the daily standard deviation
for many stocks.84 While the announcement probably does mean that manage-
ment considers the stock a good (or potentially good) buy in the short term, its
long-term implications are more ambiguous. Management could indeed be
projecting increased earnings. But it also could have extra cash due to a dearth
of acceptable new investments, heralding a future of contraction. One study
backs up this negative reading, showing an 11.95% decline in the return on
assets of a large class of OMR firms in the three-year period following announce-
ment.85
Part of the signal's weakness stems from the fact that OMR announcements
carry no commitment to buy. Any stock price effects of the program are
accordingly difficult to project. The signal's credibility also suffers from the
absence of an evident cost imposed on the firm that signals falsely.86 Finally,
prior to 2004, no mandatory disclosure rule required the purchasing firm to
make ongoing disclosures of its OMR activity. 87 Absent a disclosure mandate,
the inquirer was remitted to inferences drawn from the balance sheet's report of
shares outstanding and the cash flow statement's report of financing activity.
Pervin K. Shroff, Equity Undervaluation and Decisions Related to Repurchase Tender Offers: An
Empirical Investigation, 50 J. FIN. 2399, 2400-01 (2000).
82. Comment & Jarrell, supra note 77, at 1245. The stronger the signal, the greater the managers'
shareholdings, the larger the premium, and the larger the proportion of shares covered by the offer. Id.
83. Where the insiders have been selling the announcement, abnormal return is lower. See D'Mello
& Shroff, supra note 81, at 2400-01.
84. Ikenberry et al., supra note 78, at 183.
85. See Grullon & Michaely, supra note 75.
86. Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 17, at 9.
87. In December 2003, The SEC revised its rules to require quarterly disclosure of the number of
shares purchased in the previous quarter, the average price paid per share, the number of purchases
made as part of an announced OMR program, and the maximum number of shares remaining that may
be purchased under the program. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8335, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,952 (Nov. 17, 2003).
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Unsurprisingly, repurchasing managers began disclosing their repurchase activ-
ity voluntarily, on an after-the-fact basis,88 showing the market that they staked
money on their judgment of undervaluation and separating themselves from
firms making "cheap talk" repurchase announcements.
With dividends, the signal is even weaker-here the average abnormal stock
return is only 1%. Controversy over the signal's value is correspondingly
sharper. The drop from the OMR announcement's 3% uptick to the dividend's
1% can be partly accounted for by reference to the size of the incremental cash
distribution. Dividend increases tend to involve much less money. OMR an-
nouncements target an average 6.6% of the firm's equity,89 and the average
amount of stock actually repurchased is 75% of the target amount across three
years (drawing on the high end of estimates); the average repurchase payout is
2% to 3% of equity value per annum. The average dividend is 0.76% of equity
value, 90 and the average cash increment due to an increase is 0.17% of equity
value. 9 Such a modest cash commitment invites a "cheap talk" characteriza-
tion, undermining the credibility of the signal.92 Finally, after the cash differen-
tial is factored out, the dividend signal's content is diminished by the same
ambiguities that obscure the content of OMR announcements.
A separate body of empirical results further weakens the case for dividend
increases as signals. These studies look at performance measures in years
subsequent to the dividend 93 to see whether performance does in fact improve.
While two reports say "yes" for a period after the announcement, 94 most say
"no."9 5 In the emerging picture, dividend increases are followers rather than
88. Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 17, at 10.
89. Jagannathan et el., supra note 12, at 357.
90. Id. at 374.
91. Grullon & Michaely, supra note 75.
92. See DeAngelo et al., supra note 53, at 342-43.
93. For first-generation studies not anticipating the future, see Joseph Aharony & Itzhak Swary,
Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 35
J. FiN. 1 (1980); Paul Asquith & David Mullins, The Impact of Initiating Dividend Payments on
Shareholders' Wealth, 56 J. Bus. 77 (1983).
94. See Roni Michaely et al., Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations and Omissions: Overreaction
or Drift?, 50 J. FiN. 573 (1995) (documenting a positive price drift for firms that initiate or resume
dividends, 1964-1988); Doron Nissim & Amir Ziv, Dividend Changes and Future Profitability, 61 J.
FIN. 2111 (2001) (showing that dividend changes are positively related to earnings changes for a
two-year period ex post).
95. For a summary, see La Porta et al., supra note 40, at 2. The most devastating study is DeAngelo
et al., supra note 53, at 342-43, which isolates a group of firms with five years of consecutive earnings
increases followed by five consecutive years of declining earnings. The authors isolate the dividend in
the middle year in the sequence and find that 68.3% of the firms increase the dividend in that year, and
two-thirds of those firms increasing the dividend do so in an amount greater than or equal to the
earnings increase in the peak year. The inference is that managers are overoptimistic. See also Shlomo
Benartzi et al., Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?, 52 J. FIN. 1007 (1997) (finding
a strong delayed and contemporary correlation between dividend changes and earnings but finding no
evidence of a positive relation between dividend changes and future earnings increases); Rodney D.
Boehme & Sorin M. Sorescu, The Long-Run Performance Following Dividend Initiations and Resump-
tions: Underreaction or Product of Chance?, 62 J. FIN. 871 (2002) (attacking Michaely et al., supra
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leaders. Management increases the dividend because earnings and cash flows
have increased in immediate past periods. Even as managers who raise divi-
dends remain optimistic-perhaps overly optimistic-about future results, their
visions of a more successful future do not generate the dividend decision. Cash
flow security and continuity are what count, and they are matters verifiable in
existing numbers.
To sum up, both dividend and OMR announcements send weak signals. Both
imply management confidence. An OMR also implies management's view that
the stock is undervalued. But one should not infer much more.96 The OMR
framework's flexibility robs it of much of its signaling value. OMR firms
eschew firm commitments. If OMR firms wished to import more credibility to
their signals, they easily could commit to buy. Signaling accordingly fails as a
primary explanation for the 1990s shift to payout by OMR. It also makes for
only a lightweight justification. The corporate governance system holds out
plenty of ways to signal confidence about future performance. For example, a
hard-wired set of rules assuring unbending and inveterate independence in the
firm's outside directors and auditors would speak volumes about management's
self-confidence. But we have seen few such signals.
III. AGENCY: STABLE DIVIDENDS, SPECIAL DIVIDENDS, AND STOCK OPTIONS
Some explain payout practice by referring to tensions in the shareholder-
management relationship. This school of thought abandons the assumption-
common to both substitution and signaling theory-that management acts to
maximize benefits to the shareholders.97 It instead makes reference to agency
theory and agency cost reduction. When first articulated two decades ago, this
agency explanation focused on the stable dividend payouts seen in practice,
hypothesizing that the steadiness palliates management's tendency to reinvest
cash flows in projects where the rate of return r is less than the cost of capital
note 94, by showing that post-announcement, abnormal return results do not include all subsamples and
become insignificant when portfolios are value-weighted by market capitalization); Stephen H. Pen-
man, The Predictive Content of Earnings Forecasts and Dividends, 38 J. FIN. 1181 (1983) (finding,
after controlling for management's future earnings forecast, that dividends have little informational
content).
The cases where dividends more clearly have information content are (1) when the earnings go up
but the dividend goes down, see Richard Leftwich & Mark Zmijewski, Contemporaneous Announce-
ments of Dividends Earnings, 9 J. Accr. AUDITING & FiN. 725 (1994), and (2) when earnings go down
and the dividend goes up, see Harry DeAngelo et al., Dividends and Losses, 47 J. FIN. 1837 (1992).
96. The survey evidence is in accord. See BRAv ET AL., supra note 29 (concluding that while
management sees payouts as having information content, management neither intends academic
signaling nor believes any signal adds to publicly disclosed information); H. Kent Baker & Gary E.
Powell, How Corporate Managers View Dividend Policy, 38 Q.J. Bus. & ECON. 17 (1999) (showing
that managers believe dividends to be a positive signal); H. Kent Baker et al., A Survey of Management
Views on Dividend Policy, 22 FIN. MGmT. 78 (1985) (same).
97. See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on
Incumbency Rents, 103 J. POL. EcON. 75, 77-78 (1995).
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k.9 8 That point resonates at a structural level, but is less suited to explain the
subjective motivations of managers who increase dividends. Section A of this
Part shows that an agency approach nonetheless helps us understand the 1990s
shift to repurchases: Managers needed a way to distribute extra cash without
making a commitment to maintain the level of payment. OMRs gave them the
flexibility to pay out, avoiding r < k reinvestment of earnings. Section B
darkens the picture, showing that the 1990s expansion of stock option compensa-
tion for both top managers and employees figures prominently in the shift.
Section C challenges the attribution of greater flexibility to OMRs, asserting
that the device of the special dividend holds out equal flexibility.
A. STABLE DIVIDENDS AND OPTIMAL INVESTMENTS
1. The Stable Dividend
Large American corporations shape their dividend policy to accord with a
conventional wisdom. This holds that the payout level should be set as a fixed
amount-for example, $2.00 per year, per share, to be paid even though
earnings fall-rather than as a fixed percentage of earnings yielding a fluctuat-
ing amount. A firm increases the fixed amount to a higher fixed amount only if
the new, higher payout level clearly can be sustained against negative shocks to
corporate cash flow.99 It follows that dividend increases lag earnings increases
across time, and that the dividend will not be cut to fund a good investment.
Managers take the position that any departure from this conservative practice
traverses shareholder preferences with destabilizing results. In bad times, manag-
ers feel constrained to avoid dividend cuts even when they have very good
alternate uses for the cash. ° The firm will attempt to borrow to maintain the
dividend until relief comes in the form of a cyclical recovery. If forced to cut
the dividend, managers look for air cover in the form of dividend reductions by
their competitors.101 It follows that managers resolve doubts against dividend
increases, because once made, they stick. They stick because managers fear
98. The leading description of this problem is Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 Am. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). The idea's origins can be traced to
precedent legal literature, however. See Victor Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA.
L. REv. 85, 95-97 (1980).
99. BRAv ET AL., supra note 29, at 13, report that 87% of the managers they surveyed agreed that the
reference point for setting dividends is the previous period's payment. See also Baker et al., supra note
96. Formal empirical confirmation of the pattern is set out in the famous study by Lintner, supra note
45. For a recent reconfirmation of the value of Lintner's model in understanding stock price behavior,
see Hyun Mo Sung & Jorge L. Urritia, Long-Term and Short-Term Causal Relations Between Dividends
and Stock Prices: A Test of Lintner's Dividend Model and the Present Value Model of Stock Prices, 18
J. FIN. REs. 171 (1995).
100. BRAv ET AL., supra note 29, at 13, report that 97% of the dividend-paying firms in their survey
agree that the dividend is cut only as a last resort; see also Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo,
Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms, 45 J. FIN.
1415 (1990); Albert Eddy & Bruce Seifert, Dividend Changes of Financially Weak Firms, 21 FIN. REv.
419 (1986) (showing that distressed firms tend to cut rather than eliminate their dividends).
101. See BRAv ET AL., supra note 29, at 14.
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dividend cuts. And they have their reasons: As discussed above, on average, a
dividend increase yields a 1% announcement-period increase in the stock price,
but a cut produces a 6% price drop."°2
Given all of this, it comes as no surprise that firms that pay dividends are
larger than firms that do not pay, that their operating income is higher, and that
their earnings records have a lower standard deviation.10 3 A governance implica-
tion also follows for dividend-paying firms: Dividend increases are a second-
order decision. The existing dividend's maintenance is a given. Management
considers increasing the dividend only after completing all investment decision-
making and assuring itself of liquidity for the coming period's operations. The
board of directors is only minimally involved,'4
2. The Agency Explanation
An agency cost explanation of payout practice first appeared in the 1980s. In
those days, payout policy was a cutting-edge issue in corporate politics, and
today's shareholder-value-maximization norm was in gestation. Management's
critics charged that managers behaved in overly risk-averse ways, reinvesting
earnings to make the company bigger and safer whether or not the practice
enhanced shareholder value. The managers invested in suboptimal (r < k)
projects, seeking to make their empires grow. 05 Internally generated cash flows
presented an easy source of financing for such projects. They were the cheapest
funds available and suited risk-averse managers wary of a stepped-up debt-to-
equity ratio. The critics charged that these reinvested monies, termed "free cash
flows," should have been paid out, whether as dividends or repurchases. From
this perspective, the era's hostile takeovers and leveraged restructurings, with
their huge, single-shot payouts to shareholders, amounted to compensation for
years of misinvested free cash flows. With this harsh payout medicine, actors in
the capital markets imposed the shareholder-value norm on unwilling managers.
102. See Denis et al., supra note 80, at 572. Cuts also are bigger than increases. Where increases
average 0.76% of equity value, cuts average 4.3%. Cutting firms average a dividend-to-earnings payout
ratio of 43.53%, which means they really are hurting. Jagannathan et al., supra note 12, at 373-74.
One contrarian study should be mentioned. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Earnings Informa-
tion Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 149 (1988), looks at 172 firms
that omit dividends with results that contradict signaling theory. The study finds that earnings decline in
the year of the omission but improve significantly in the next several years.
103. See Denis et al., supra note 80, at 572.
104. See BAv ET AL., supra note 29, at 8; see also S.W. Pruitt & Lawrence J. Gitman, The
Interaction Between the Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions of Major US Firms, 26 FIN.
REV. 409 (1991) (surveying 114 CFOs and concluding that dividend decisions are made independently
of investment and financing decisions); cf. Eugene Fama, The Empirical Relationship Between the
Dividend and Investment Decisions of Firms, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 304 (1974) (finding that managers'
dividend and investment decisions are independent); LEASE ET AL., supra note 14, at 130 (concluding
that, despite the importance of dividend policy, there is no evidence that the market rewards careful
payout management with a higher stock price).
105. See Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 61, 66.
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The stable dividend, long a puzzle, made more sense in this context. The
steady payout convention checks the tendency toward suboptimal investment of
internally generated capital. For every dollar pumped out as a dividend, the
investing manager has to go to outside capital markets for a new dollar. The
stable dividend thus forces ongoing resort to outside financing, 10 6 bonding the
managers to act in the shareholders' interest. According to Rozeff, this explana-
tion's originator, the resort to outside funding forces management to reduce
agency costs and reveal information to actors in the capital markets. 0 7 Easter-
brook, reiterating the theory, stressed the latter point--dividends "start up"
monitoring by capital market actors who, unlike shareholders, are unhobbled by
collective action problems.' 08
The agency explanation offers a plausible answer to the question why, despite
a tax disadvantage, a shareholder rationally might prefer $1 to be paid out as a
dividend rather than reinvested in an r > k project. Empirical studies set out
evidence backing this view. 0 9 Evidence in other studies negates it, however.l 0
106. See Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta, and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout
Ratios, 5 J. FIN. REs. 249 (1982).
107. Id. at 250-51. Rozeff, strictly following the early agency paradigm, also suggests that dividend
policy and insider ownership are substitute tools to reduce agency costs, with firms with high
percentages of insider ownership paying small dividends. Id. at 250-52. Subsequent empirical work
negates this picture. Diane K. Schooley & L. Dwayne Barney, Jr., Using Dividend Policy and
Managerial Ownership To Reduce Agency Costs, 17 J. FIN. REs. 363 (1994), shows that the relation
between the dividend payout ratio and management ownership is nonmonotonic. Beyond a certain
point, greater management ownership causes the dividend payment to rise.
108. Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 650,
653, 655 (1984). Easterbrook adds a point about management risk-aversion: to replace internal flows,
managers may use leverage they might otherwise avoid, thereby benefiting shareholders. Id. at 653-54.
Allen et al., supra note 57, update the agency argument to the 1990s. They argue that dividends
attract institutional owners, which relatively speaking are tax-advantaged. The institutions constitute a
better informed, more active shareholder population, importing better governance and lower agency
costs.
109. Sinha et al., supra note 40, at 4-6, is the most recent. The Sinha paper looks at a broad
selection of traded stocks for the period 1981 to 2001 and finds that firms that pay out (whether by
dividend or OMR) have a significantly lower cost of capital. They also find that dividend payers have a
slightly lower cost of capital than OMR firms, implying a disciplinary advantage for dividends. See also
Mahmoud A. Moh'd et al., An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship Between Agency Theory and
Dividend Policy, 30 FIN. REV. 367 (1995), which performs a time-series, cross-sectional analysis of 341
firms for the period 1972-1989. According to the authors, id. at 379-80: (1) firms experiencing or about
to experience high rates of revenue growth tend to establish lower dividend payouts; (2) dividend
payout increases as a function of firm size (supporting the view that larger firms have higher agency
costs and smaller firms have higher financing transaction costs); (3) dividend payout is inversely related
to intrinsic business risk; (4) firms establish a lower dividend payout as their operating and financial
leverage mix increases; (5) higher dividend payouts are observed when management holds a low
percentage of shares and as outside ownership becomes more dispersed; and (6) firms tend to establish
higher payouts as institutional ownership increases. See also La Porta et al., supra note 40 (studying
4000 firms in thirty-three countries and showing that higher dividend payouts occur in common-law
countries, where investor protection is better).
The agency explanation also has been shown to work well with the RTOs of the 1980s. See Erik Lie,
Excess Funds and Agency Problems: An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements, 13 REv.
FIN. STUD. 219 (2000) (showing a positive relationship between the market reaction to an RTO
announcement and the amount of excess cash held by the RTO firm); Tom Nohel & Vefa Tarham, Share
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Absent definitive proof or negation-which we may never receive-the agency
explanation resonates best in the long-term, rational-expectations framework
where it originated. It seems less plausible as an explanation for day-to-day
practice. Managers who raise the dividend may see themselves in a signaling
mode " but stoutly deny that governance discipline bears on the decision. I 
2
And, while agency theory does shed light on the shareholders' puzzling attach-
ment to steady payouts, this preference may be better addressed with behavioral
theories. 13
3. Agency, Shareholder Value, and the Shift to OMRs
An agency explanation still can play a leading role in the overall account,
provided we situate it in history and include the 1990s shift to OMRs. In the
1980s, shareholder-value maximization was a rallying cry for shareholder capi-
tal as it assaulted management fortresses. Things changed in the 1990s. Manag-
ers internalized the norm, building rrsumfs as shareholder-value maximizers. A
governance success story accompanied the shift. Corporate America, now pointed
in the right normative direction, had solved the problem of separated ownership
and control. Stock options better aligned managers' incentives with those of
their shareholders. Managers emerged in the risk-neutral posture counseled by
financial economics. They unbundled conglomerates and concentrated on core
competencies. They laid off excess workers. They took on the challenge of
global markets.
High leverage, thought by observers in the 1980s to be the key that unlocked
Repurchases and Firm Performance: New Evidence on the Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, 49 J. FIN.
ECON. 187 (1998) (showing improved performance subsequent to 1980s RTOs).
110. See Denis et al., supra note 80, at 569. This article takes a sample of 6777 large dividend
increases, 1962-1988, and finds no relationship between the magnitude of the change in payout and
Tobin's Q. (Tobin's Q is a widely used measure of productivity: the market value of the firm's equity
divided by the replacement cost of its assets.) If the agency explanation were cogent, firms with a
Tobin's Q of less than one would have been paying out higher dividends. The study finds that contrary
to the agency prediction, low-Tobin's-Q firms actually increase their capital expenditures after dividend
increases.
11. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
112. See BRAY ET AL., supra note 29, at 22 (noting that 88% of the managers surveyed make this
denial).
113. See Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends, 13 J.
FIN. ECON. 253 (1984) (posing Thaler and Shefrin's theory of self control as an explanation: the
dividend rations out small amounts while leaving the principal of the investment intact, averting the
necessity of decisionmaking and possible regrets). There is also behavioral analysis of management
decisionmaking. See George M. Frankfurter & William R. Lane, The Rationality of Dividends, 1 INT'L
REv. FIN. ANALYsiS 115 (1984) (suggesting that habit may reflect cultural and societal factors rather than
rational economic behavior and that the socio-economic evolution of the modem corporation best
explains dividend behavior); William T. Waller, Jr., The Concept of Habit in Economic Analysis, 22 J.
ECON. IssuEs 113 (1989) (distinguishing between routine and ritualized habits and stressing the
socialized aspects of habitual behavior). Merton H. Miller, Behavioral Rationality in Finance: The
Case of Dividends, 59 J. Bus. S451 (1986), admits that behaviorism and dividends fit together, but likes
the fit better on the shareholder side than on the management side. Unsurprisingly, Miller concludes
that rational-expectations analysis holds out more promise in the long run.
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value, turned out to be unnecessary. 1 4 Its disappearance seemed to remove a
threat that pursuit of shareholder value could have perverse effects. Many
observers in the 1980s warned that high leverage meant underinvestment in
long-term projects. In the 1990s, with the leverage strategy abandoned, value-
maximizing managers invested aggressively. The only apparent costs of value
maximization fell on employees let go due to cost cutting.
The shift to OMRs fits neatly in this picture. Management, having internal-
ized the shareholder-value-maximization norm, was less prone to put free cash
flow into suboptimal projects. But it internalized the norm only in part. Manag-
ers still were not ready to sign on to the long-term payout commitment implied
by the stable dividend, not to mention the associated disciplinary effects. OMR
programs filled the gap, permitting cash to be paid out without commitment.
This OMR advantage was first discovered in the wake of the stock market crash
of 1987. The crash brought an unprecedented increase in OMR programs: 507
OMR announcements were made between October 19 and October 31, 1987,
compared with a total of 115 announcements in all of 1985. The number of
announcements dropped immediately thereafter but remained at historic highs
until the recession of the early 1990s. OMR announcements fell to 211 in 1991,
with the pattern of increase of the 1990s beginning after 1993.'15
Studies of OMR behavior confirm this point. Managers use OMRs to pay out
temporary inflows of cash.'" 6 Aggregate repurchases are volatile, varying with
the business cycle." 7 The market accepts this pattern, reading no negative
signal from the cessation of OMR outflows." l8 There is even a tie to 1980s
agency theory-the market reacts with particular favor when a firm with a
declining base of new investments announces an OMR program." 9 In addition,
OMR firms' returns on assets tend to decline in the years post-announcement,
implying a deteriorating opportunity set. 12
0
This economic profile determines the governance practice. OMRs, like divi-
dend increases, are highly sensitive to, and negatively correlated with, invest-
ment activity. 12' In contrast, the steady dividend is determined independently
114. Leverage increases were a significant motivation for 1980s RTOs. See Baker et al., supra note
38, at 251.
115. See Jagannathan et al., supra note 12, at 362.
116. See Wayne Guay & Jarrad Harford, The Cash-Flow Permanence and Information Content of
Dividend Increases Versus Repurchases, 57 J. FIN. EcON. 385, 386-87 (2000) (showing that OMRs
distribute temporary cash flow shocks, measured by comparing cash flows ex ante and ex post the OMR
announcement); Clifford P. Stephens & Michael S. Weisbach, Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-
Market Repurchase Programs, 53 J. FiN. 313 (1998) (showing that managers adjust OMR activity for
unexpected changes in cash position).
117. See Jagannathan et al., supra note 12, at 357-58.
118. Or so most managers believe. See BRAV ET AL., supra note 29, at 16 (noting that only 22.5% of
the managers surveyed believe that reducing repurchases carries negative consequences).
119. See Grullon & Michaely, supra note 75.
120. Id. at 22-26. The return on assets for a large sample of announcements, from 1980 to 1994, was
14.4% three years before the announcement and 11.95% three years after the announcement.
121. See id. (noting that 80% of the managers surveyed confirmed this point).
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from investments. In both cases, decisions respecting investments come first. As
with dividends, there is little board involvement with OMRs.
122
There arises an inference of governance success. Management uses OMRs to
pay out monies for which it has no productive use, monies that it otherwise
might reinvest suboptimally. This practice suits diverse shareholder interests,
even apart from the tax advantage. Those who wish to liquidate their invest-
ments can do so in the market; those who do not wish to share in the payout can
hold.
But a caveat must be entered. Recall that OMR payouts reached parity with
dividend payouts at the end of the 1990s even as the overall corporate payout
rate remained at historic levels. 23 This implies that OMRs provide management
a handy vehicle for payouts without commitments-a retreat from the disciplin-
ary model of dividend. So minimal is the OMR commitment that 10% of firms
making announcements buy back less than 5% of the shares covered. 124 This
negative-agency-cost implication grows in magnitude if the correlation between
repurchase activity and a change in compensation policy is recognized. The
compensation change-also ushered in by the 1990s shift to shareholder capital-
ism-was the expansion of stock option compensation for both top managers
and employees.
B. STOCK OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNISM
Firms with large stock option plans are more likely to announce share
repurchase plans. 125 Actual amounts repurchased in OMR programs relate
positively to the total numbers of options exercisable. 126 Some studies report
that firms repurchase gradually over the lives of options to reduce the options'
dilutive effect.' 27 But there is also evidence that firms time repurchase announce-
ments around the times stock options are being exercised. 28 Whatever the
timing, the numbers are large. One survey finds that firms repurchase roughly
122. Where a dividend decision culminates in a board resolution, OMRs follow from a board
delegation. The board approves a maximum amount annually or semiannually (although a ceiling might
be raised to take advantage of a market price break). Id.
123. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
124. There appear to be two types of OMR firms: those that buy back substantially all shares
projected and those that buy almost none. On an aggregate basis, OMR firms eventually buy back
around three-quarters of the shares targeted. Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 116, at 314; see also
Jagannathan et al., supra note 12, at 357 (showing an aggregate repurchase range of 53 to 72%).
125. Mary E. Barth & Ron Kasznik, Share Repurchases and Intangible Assets, 28 J. AccT. & EcON.
211, 238 (1999).
126. Kathleen M. Kahle, When a Buyback Isn't a Buyback: Open Market Repurchases and Em-
ployee Options, 63 J. FiN. ECON. 235, 238 (2002).
127. E.g., ScoT- J. WEISBENNER, CORPORATE SHARE REPURCHASES N THE 1990S: WHAT ROLE Do STOCK
OnONS PLAY? 16 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2000-29, 2000), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2000/200029/200029pap.pdf.
128. Konan Chan et al., Do Managers Knowingly Repurchase Stock in the Open Market? 2 n.4
(Aug. 2001) (unpublished working paper), at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-jgspaper/W_Ikenberry-
insiderv6.pdf.
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38% of the shares underlying their option grants prior to exercise. 129 The more
stock options outstanding, the more stock the firms repurchase. Managers admit
this. Three-fifths of the executives reporting in one survey acknowledged that
they instituted an OMR program to prepare for stock option exercise. 13
0
What inferences should be drawn? On the one hand, this could be shareholder
capitalism at its best. If stock options better align the interests of managers and
shareholders, the correlation may be unimportant. Whatever the motivation, the
effect is still to increase payouts of free cash flows, reducing misinvestment. On
the other hand, if stock options are a badly designed compensation device that
overpays managers in rising markets and in extreme cases imports perverse
incentives, 1 ' then OMRs may be part of an agency problem rather than an
agency solution.
At a minimum, the causal tie between stock options and repurchases suggests
that repurchases should be viewed as a potential cost, in addition to being
viewed as a means to avoid suboptimal investments. In the simple case, the firm
uses one dollar to repurchase as an alternate means of releasing free cash flow,
replacing one dollar of dividend. The repurchase transfers wealth from the firm
to selling shareholders; it enhances value for the holding shareholders due to the
reduction in the number of outstanding equity claims (provided that the repur-
chased stock is not overvalued). Compare with the case where a firm uses one
dollar to repurchase for the purpose of warehousing shares to use as consider-
ation in a later merger. Here the one dollar invested enhances value for the
holding shareholders only to the extent the later merger succeeds. More particu-
larly, the one dollar benefits the shareholders only if (1) the repurchased stock is
not overvalued and (2) the value increment per share under the merger is greater
than the dilution cost per share of the merger consideration. Arguably, stock
option warehousing works similarly. The one dollar enhances value only if the
option's positive incentive effect exceeds its dilution cost, whether stemming
from overpriced stock at the time of repurchase or later stock option exercise.
Repurchase activity also has tended to obscure the dilution cost of option
exercises. Under Financial Accounting Standard ("FAS") No. 123, as stated
prior to 2004, firms were not required to deduct the value of the option from
their net income as expenses, as they would with cash compensation. 13 2 But the
cost eventually showed up in the form of dilution of each share's pro rata claim
129. See WEISBENNER, supra note 127, at 23.
130. Id. at 8 (citing a 1999 survey of 1600 CFOs); see also BRAv ET AL., supra note 29, at 29 (noting
that two-thirds of the respondents in their survey acknowledged that offsetting stock option dilution was
a motivation for repurchases).
131. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,
17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 82.
132. ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
123 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1995). A revision of FAS No. 123, adopted in December
2004, requires firms to expense the value of stock option grants after June 15, 2005. An SEC order has
delayed the effectiveness of the revised standard, so calendar-year reporting forms will not have to
conform until January 1, 2006. See Press Release, SEC, Commission Amends Compliance Dates for
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to the firm's equity. Under FAS No. 128, the firm must separately report its
earnings per share as if each outstanding in-the-money option had been exer-
cised. 133 When calculating earnings per share, the "treasury stock method" is
employed. This assumes that the exercise price of the option, received by the
firm, is used to repurchase a share of stock at the current market price. When
total earnings are divided by the total number of shares, each presently outstand-
ing share counts as one in the denominator, and each share under an option
counts as less than one, according to the formula P - X / P, where P is the
current stock price and X is the lower exercise price. To the extent the firm buys
back stock before having to make this calculation, it reduces the number of
shares in the denominator, eliminating the dilutive effect of the options.1 34 With
payout by dividend, the impact on earnings per share would be more apparent.
Given warehousing through OMRs, the cost of the exercised option to the
shareholders is the difference between the market price of the share repurchased
and the option's exercise price. If we assume that options are exercised in an
amount equal to Y percent of the firm's outstanding shares, the cash wealth
transfer from the shareholders to exercising executives and employees equals
Y(1 - X / P) percent of the value of the firm.135 This cost was cognizable in the
rising stock market of the 1990s. Liang and Sharpe's study of 144 large firms
from 1994 to 1998 shows that the difference between the exercise price of
options exercised and the market value of shares repurchased amounted to
0.25% of the value of the firm in 1994 to 0.74% in 1998.136 Corporate reports
do not break out these figures. Repurchases, then, -have been obscuring the cost
of stock options, thereby making it easier for boards of directors to be generous
as to the number of options granted and the programs' pricing and structuring.
Repurchases simultaneously serve the purpose of earnings management.
137
Earnings per share, the firm's key quarterly result, falls in the wake of option
exercises and rises due to repurchase activity. It follows that stepped-up repur-
chases can protect reported results. In a market where missing the analysts'
quarterly earnings per share projection by a cent or two causes a magnified
negative shock to the stock price, the power to time OMR activity imports a
useful public relations tool--or at least it did in the 1990s, when such manipula-
FASB Statement No. 123R on Employee Stock Options (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2005-57.htm.
133. EARNINGS PER SHARE, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 128 (Financial Account-
ing Standards Bd. 1997).
134. WEISBENNER, supra note 127, at 5-6. If the firm waits until the option is exercised before buying
back a share of stock to cover it, it loses this pre-exercise cosmetic effect.
135. LIAG & SHARPE, supra note 31. If the dividend is not cut to make up for the repurchase
payouts, the firm's asset base shrinks.
136. Id. at 9. Liang and Sharpe also show an average 1% annual reduction in shares outstanding due
to stock option exercise and cash-out flows from repurchases rising from 1.19% of market value in
1994 to 1.98% in 1997. Meanwhile, the net annual payout for repurchases, taken as a percentage of the
firms' income, rose from 17% in 1994 to 41% in 1998. Id.
137. WEISBENNER, supra note 127, at 8.
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tions were dismissed as benign income-smoothing. 38 Now, after a spate of
accounting scandals and a change of prevailing opinion on income-smoothing,
the tie to the shareholder interest looks more attenuated. An additional question-
able incentive arises when the firm bases annual bonuses and long-term perfor-
mance incentives on earnings per share. 139 Here, earnings management directly
impacts the top managers' annual pay packets.
These agency problems become even more acute when we consider the
dividend versus repurchase decision from an option-holder's point of view.
Dividends are paid to shareholders but not to option-holders. One dollar paid
out as a dividend does an option-holder no good unless the option is dividend-
protected, that is, unless the option contract provides for a diminution of the
exercise price to make up for the dividend. But only 1% of executives have
dividend-protected stock options. 140 It follows that the value of a manager's
stock options is negatively related to the firm's expected dividend payout.
Assume a manager with a ten-year option. Further assume that the firm's stock
price has a volatility of 30%, and the risk-free rate of return is 5%. Under the
Black-Scholes option-pricing model,' 41 a cut in the dividend yield from 2% to
1% increases the option's value by 18%. Cutting the dividend entirely raises
option value by 39%. 142
Stock options raise the financial stakes of the choice between dividends and
repurchases, giving managers a strong incentive to prefer repurchases. Unsurpris-
ingly, empirical studies show a strong correlation between stock options and
payout choices. The probability of stock repurchase is positively related to the
presence of stock options. 143 Dividends are strongly negatively correlated with
options.' 44 A study of the largest S&P 500 firms from 1994 to 1997 shows that
even as the repurchase payout rose from 17% to 41% as a percentage of income,
the dividend yield dropped steadily from 2.76% to 1.41%.
145
It follows that self-interest figured powerfully in the 1990s shift from divi-
138. See William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439,
465-66 (2003).
139. About 25% of firms do so, according to a 1993 Hay Group study. See WEISBENNER, supra note
127, at 6.
140. KEvIN J. MURPHY, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, (Univ. of S. Cal., Working Paper, 1998), reported
in WEISBENNER, supra note 127, at 9 n.10.
141. Black-Scholes employs stochastic calculus to model option value as a function of the interrela-
tion of five factors: stock price, exercise price, duration, volatility, and the risk-free rate of return.
BRATTON, supra note 73, at 135-36.
142. WEISBENNER, supra note 127, at 9.
143. See CHRISTINE JOLLS, STOCK REPURCHASES AND INCENTIVE COMPENSATION 16-17 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6467, 1998).
144. See George W. Fenn & Nellie Liang, Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incen-
tives, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 45, 47-48 (2001) (using the Lambert model to show that a one-percent standard
deviation change in the stock option variable reduces dividends by 38 basis points).
145. LtANG & SHARPE, supra note 31, at 17.
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dends to repurchases. 46 But questions still arise as to the role to be accorded in
the overall account to management pocket-lining. Agency improvement stories
have been offered to counter the implication of perverse incentives. For ex-
ample, it has been shown that stock option compensation tends to be associated
with firms whose profiles signal agency problems-low management stock
ownership, limited investment opportunities, and high free cash flow.' 4 7 Given
high management stock ownership, abundant investment opportunities, and
limited free cash flow, the statistical connection between repurchases and stock
options diminishes.1 48 Repurchase activity also increases with high market-to-
book ratios and volatile operating income. These observations tend to support
the flexibility explanation for repurchases, 149 ameliorating the negative implica-
tions of earnings management and option exercise.
The negative implications are not dispelled, however. But the causal ties that
link option compensation and payout policy remain more an academic concern
than an active topic in real-world governance discussions, even as stock option
practice has risen to the top of governance reform agendas in the post-Enron
era. One suspects that shareholders continue to base expectations on the gover-
nance framework of twenty years ago. Fearful of suboptimal earnings reinvest-
ment and so grateful when management does distribute cash, shareholders ask
no further questions as to the mode of payout. The next section shows that
shareholders can indeed ask questions about the wisdom of OMR policy
without fear of excessive earnings retention. Part IV goes on to show that
shareholder passivity holds out potential costs: To the extent that management's
interest in its own option compensation drives payout decisions, firms can be
expected to repurchase overvalued stock, injuring their long-term shareholders.
C. DIVIDENDS AND FLEXIBILITY
The opportunism suggested by the tie to option compensation does not by
itself displace the OMR from its position as the preferred mode of distributing
irregular free cash flows. If dividends are sticky and cannot be cut as a practical
matter, then firms arguably have no choice but to buy back stock when they
experience positive cash flow shocks.
But the flexibility justification does not withstand inspection. Firms can
146. It should be noted that in firms with high management stock ownership, the move to dividend
tax-rate parity can be expected to trigger a shift to dividends. This already has been seen at firms like
Citibank (Sanford Weill) and Viacom (Sumner Redstone). See Brown, supra note 47.
147. Fenn & Liang, supra note 144, at 47; see also Cai, supra note 27, at 16 (comparing firms that
repurchase to firms that make acquisitions and showing a higher level of CEO stock ownership in firms
that repurchase).
148. Fenn & Liang, supra note 144, at 48.
149. Id. There also is evidence associating repurchase activity more with dilution due to employee
stock ownership plans than with dilution due to stock exercises by top managers, indicating that
earnings management may loom larger than raw self-interest as a motivation. See WEISBENNER, supra
note 127 (showing that while the overall size of the stock option program is an indicator of repurchase
activity, there is no correlation between repurchases and the option holdings of the top five executives).
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disgorge temporary cash flows by dividend without committing to a permanent
increase. All they need to do is separate their declarations, distinguishing
regular from special dividends. The "special" designation tells the shareholders
that repetition should not be expected.' 50 Since the designation is defensive,
there is no reason to expect the market to disbelieve or misunderstand it. Nor is
this suggestion merely hypothetical. Prior to the 1970s, firms routinely used
special dividends to disgorge temporary cash flows.
From 1927 to 1949, special dividends averaged 9.8% of the total dividend
payout, and from 1927 to the 1950s, 26.2% of dividend-paying firms paid
specials.1 51 Specials were used flexibly. They came and went without stickiness.
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner ("DDS") report that from 1926 to 1995, cuts
of specials outnumbered cuts of regulars by four to one. The median increase
for a regular dividend was 25%, whereas the median increase for a special was
60%. While the stock market reacted favorably to announcements of spe-
cials-a 1% abnormal return on average-the reaction was more muted than the
reaction to increases of regulars. And cuts of specials triggered no negative
market response, at least when the special was an isolated event. 152
But then specials did die out. Compared to the 1940s when 61.7% of NYSE
companies paid at least one special, only 4.9% paid one in the early 1990s.
153
Indeed, specials, as vehicles for paying occasional cash, had more or less
disappeared by the 1970s. 154 DDS conclude that specials died out because, over
time, they failed to serve the occasional cash payment function. Firms that paid
specials did so with regularity-27.9% of firms paying specials did so 90% of
the time; 56.8% of firms paying specials did so more frequently than every
other year. 155 Reductions in specials tended to be accompanied by increases in
the regular dividend, so that the firms' overall payouts remained unaffected.1
56
Dividend practice, then, evolved toward homogeneity by the 1970s. Further-
more, there was no connection in time between the disappearance of specials
and the appearance of OMR programs in the late 1980s, blocking any sugges-
tion that repurchases substituted for specials.157 DDS conclude that the decline
of specials should be correlated with the rise of institutional stockholding: In the
150. See James A. Brickley, Shareholder Wealth, Information Signaling and the Specially Desig-
nated Dividend: An Empirical Study, 12 J. FiN. EcON. 187 (1983).
151. DeAngelo et al., supra note 53, at 315.
152. Id. at 312, 331-32.
153. Id. at 310.
154. Id. at 315. Through the 1950s, 26.2% of all dividend paying firms paid specials, but the average
fell to 11.2% in the 1960s, 5.4% in the 1970s, and 2.2% in the 1980s. Id. Specials in the late 1980s and
early 1990s bore no resemblance to their forebearers. These latter-day specials were large payouts made
pursuant to the era's leveraged-restructuring movement. Id. at. 319. In the late 1980s and early 1990s
there were thirty-nine specials exceeding 10% of equity value. Id.
155. Id. at 311, 322.
156. Id. at 326.
157. Id. at 312, 344-45. Nor is there a time connection between the disappearance of specials and
the finding of BAKER & WURGLER, supra note 8, at 6-16, of the disappearance of premium pricing by
dividend-paying firms around 1978.
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1960s and 1970s, these new, sophisticated shareholders saw that specials merely
substituted for regulars and held out no benefits. 1
58
Additional explanations can be suggested for the decline of specials, how-
ever. The 1960s and 1970s were the high water period of managerialism.
Specials could not have made sense to managers inclined to retain cash flows in
order to build empires. Better to homogenize payouts in a regular framework
and increase dividends at a rate lower than the rate of earnings increase. Nor,
given that shareholders in that era uncritically accepted the story that earnings
retention meant beneficial growth, would the disappearance of specials have
occasioned criticism in the investment community, whether institutional or
retail. When questions finally came up about payout policy in the 1980s, they
did so in a changed environment. Regulatory innovations made OMRs easier to
do."5 9 A generation of financial economists had sensitized observers to the tax
disadvantage of dividends. 160 Stock option compensation and earnings manage-
ment had became everyday governance tools. There was no reason to expect
managers to return to specials or to expect shareholders to demand them.
Now things have changed again. The tax disadvantage of dividends has
disappeared in substantial measure. Shareholders are asking questions about the
incentive benefits of stock options. They also question earnings management,
preferring-for now-an unvarnished picture of quarterly results. If a firm with
irregular free cash flows announces a special dividend, explains that no recur-
rence should be expected, and reports the special's cost effects (which are much
more transparent than the cost effects of option exercises), then the market
should react favorably. That specials lost their informational advantage as a
device for distributing occasional cash in the practice decades ago does not
denude them of this capability in the present environment, with its keener focus
on payout practice. Managers are figuring this out: So far in 2004, fifty-eight
companies, mostly outside of the S&P 500, have declared special dividends.
161
D. SUMMARY
OMRs can create value for long-term shareholders because they suit manage-
ment preferences as a means of cash distribution. They could beat dividends as
an agency cost-control device because, due to their flexibility, they facilitate
disgorgement of free cash flows, playing the same disciplinary role identified
for dividends in the original 1980s agency story. But the agency story has
become more complicated. OMR activity in the 1990s strongly and positively
correlated with the proliferation of stock option compensation. Repurchases
suited managers because they counteracted the dilutive effect of their own stock
158. Id. at 312, 337-38.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 184-89.
160. BAKER & WURGLER, supra note 8, at 6-16 (documenting statistical evidence of a shift of
shareholder preferences away from dividends beginning in 1978).
161. See Weber et al., supra note 5, at 97.
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option exercises. The note of self-dealing alters the agency account: But for this
convenient antidilutive effect, it is unclear how widespread OMRs would have
become. Meanwhile, the flexibility justification rings hollow. OMR proponents
stress the need to avoid the stickiness of dividends. But OMRs are not the only
mechanism available for distribution of occasional free cash flows. If manage-
ment designates an irregular distribution as a special dividend, the market will
adjust its expectations. Meanwhile, a shift to special dividends would make the
costs of executive compensation more transparent and enhance the quality of
the earnings per share report.
The special dividend alternative, taken together with the clear negative
inference arising from stock option practice, sends a strong governance signal in
favor of payout by dividend. But the signal does not conclude the matter. As we
have seen, a tax argument for repurchases remains on the table. In addition, a
final bundle of value variables needs to be confronted. These concern the
interplay among payout policy, market prices, and shareholder returns in a
world of asymmetric information. The signaling literature, described above,
only tells part of this story. We still need to confront management's claim that it
can use its informational advantage to effect bargain repurchases, arguably for
the benefit of the firm's long-term shareholders. That claim in turn confronts a
counterclaim grounded in an adverse selection possibility: Repurchased stock
can be overpriced as well as underpriced.
IV. SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND UNEQUAL TREATMENT: BARGAIN AND OVERPRICED
REPURCHASES
Some argue that OMRs provide an advantage to nonselling shareholders
because management's informational advantage gives it a trading advantage.
This bargain repurchase claim has intuitive appeal. If it is true, repurchases
enhance value for the benefit of long-term holders. Direct evidentiary support is
weak, however. Regulatory questions also come up---studies of foreign trading
markets show that any trading advantage diminishes substantially given ongo-
ing disclosure of OMR activity, disclosure not required under the federal
securities laws. To the extent that the trading advantage is trivial, nonexistent, or
a perverse effect of regulation, an adverse selection possibility also must be
recognized: OMR firms can overpay. The likelihood of overpayment increases
to the extent separate agendas like stock option dilution and earnings manage-
ment motivate OMR program activity. To the extent purchasing firms overpay,
they transfer value from the pockets of their long-term holders to those of the
selling shareholders. The bargain repurchase and overpayment possibilities,
taken together, highlight the unequal outcomes held out by OMRs. So long as
stock price and intrinsic value are not in identity, OMRs divide selling and
holding shareholders into groups of winners and losers.
Section IV.A examines the bargain repurchase claim, showing that it sounds
good in theory but has not yet been backed by solid proof. Section IV.B goes on
to suggest that to the extent the claim is correct, a weakness in SEC disclosure
20051 879
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mandates might be responsible. If the SEC imposed market-informational equal-
ity by requiring contemporaneous disclosure of OMR activity, the bargain
repurchase possibility would disappear. Section IV.C turns to the other side of
the information asymmetry problem, the repurchase of overvalued stock and its
negative impact on long-term shareholders. Prior to the JGTRRA, this problem
was more theoretical than real for most shareholders due to the repurchase tax
advantage. The diminution of the tax advantage changes the calculation.
A. MARKET TIMING AND OPTION THEORY
Managers believe they can time their OMR purchases to beat the market.
OMR firms report that they keep track of their traders' success or failure in so
doing, rewarding those who succeed as they execute their program repur-
chases.1 62 The literature of external confirmation is thin, however. Data are
lacking due to the federal securities laws' failure to require OMR firms to break
out the results of their trades in a separate disclosure. OMR proponents point to
two indirect confirmations: (1) OMR programs tend to be announced after
periods of relatively poor stock performance, 163 and (2) they tend to be ex-
ecuted when the stock trades at the low end of its long-term price range. 64 The
one direct study tests data provided voluntarily by sixty-eight firms (out of 478
firms solicited). 165 The study tests the firms' repurchases against a benchmark of
highs and lows of their stock prices. Results are mixed. Some firms, particularly
NYSE firms, show timing skill, outperforming their benchmarks; other firms,
particularly NASDAQ firms, underperform. 1
66
Another indirect empirical confirmation should be mentioned: the average
3.0%-3.5% uptick in the stock price triggered by the OMR program announce-
ment. As we have seen, some attribute this effect to the amelioration of
information asymmetries: The program signals that management thinks the
stock is undervalued.167 The post-announcement uptick is more problematic for
162. See BRAv ET AL., supra note 29, at 9 (noting that many firms claim to beat the market by one or
two percent per year, typically by employing a mechanical trading strategy with a judgment compo-
nent).
163. See Comment & Jarrell, supra note 77, at 1254 (showing that the stock price reaction to the
announcement is inversely related to the stock's performance in the prior period).
164. See Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 116, at 314 (showing a negative correlation between
repurchase activity and the previous quarter's stock price); see also Barth & Kasznik, supra note 125, at
212-13 (showing higher post-announcement returns for firms with intangible assets, consistent with the
presence of information asymmetries).
165. Douglas 0. Cook et al., On the Timing and Execution of Open Market Repurchases 4-5 (Nov.
2000) (unpublished working paper), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=251854.
166. Id. at 17-18.
167. See, e.g., Eli Bartov et al., Evidence on How Companies Choose Between Dividends and
Open-Market Stock Repurchases, 11 J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 89 (1998) (noting that undervaluation is a
leading motive for OMRs); George P. Tsetsekos et al., A Survey of Stock Repurchase Motivations and
Practices of Major US Corporations, 7 J. APPLIED Bus. REs. 15 (1991) (showing results of a survey of
210 managers and confirming that the most important circumstance triggering repurchases is a low
stock price).
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those advancing the bargain repurchase hypothesis. They face a question: If the
market price rises due to the OMR program announcement and the market
thereafter perceives management's buy-side presence, will not the market price
adjust upward so as to deprive the OMR firm of its bargain price? Call this the
"OMR value puzzle."1
68
David Ikenberry and Theo Vermaelen address the OMR value puzzle with a
formal theory of value enhancement through bargain OMRs. 169 In their view,
OMRs bring together the firm's resources and management's inside valuation
advantage to enhance value for long-term holders. The announcement of the
program, which involves no commitment to purchase, creates an option to buy.
168. Gary E. Porter et al., The Value of Open Market Repurchases of Closed-End Fund Shares, 72 J.
Bus. 257 (1999), a study of OMR programs conducted by closed-end investment companies, casts
additional light on the OMR value puzzle.
Porter, Roenfeldt, and Sicherman ("PRS") take a set of OMRs conducted by closed-end funds and
find an abnormal post-announcement return of one percent. Id. at 258-59. (This is reduced from 1.56%
after controlling for pre-announcement excess return, exchange option value, trading volume, and fund
size.) Since the fund's assets are publicly traded securities, their net asset values are transparent. On a
signaling or other information-advantage theory of OMR-announcement price reactions, there should
be no price uptick. Nor, assuming an absence of free-cash-flow abuses, should a modest buyback hold
out significant changes in the fund's agency cost profile. Closed-end funds tend to trade at a discount to
their net asset values. Agency costs are among the factors that contribute to the discount. But the
discount tends to be greater than the sum of agency and other costs of operation and so itself presents a
puzzle for orthodox financial economics. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The
Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891, 902-05
(1988).
PRS look to the discount between the funds' market capitalizations and Net Asset Values ("NAV") to
explain the announcement-period price increase. They hypothesize a closed-end fund with a NAV of
$100,000 and 10,000 shares outstanding, selling at a 10% discount from NAV for a market price of $9
per share. When the fund announces an OMR covering 10% of its shares, its stock price rises to $9.091
in response. The fund goes ahead and repurchases 1,000 shares at $9.09 1, for a total cost of $9,091. The
fund creates value for its shareholders despite the uptick. NAV decreases to $90,909 due to the cash
outflow. Given a constant 10% discount, this implies a market capitalization of $81,800. But NAV per
share nevertheless is larger than before the OMR because the number of shares outstanding has
decreased: NAV per share now is $10.101, and the market price per share is $9.091. The per-share price
increase is $0.91. The nonselling shareholders capture the dollar discount on the assets represented by
the repurchased shares; the fund pays $9,091 to retire claims on $10,000 of assets and has $90,909 of
assets left. Id. at 260-61.
PRS thus assert that the OMR creates value intrinsically. The $0.91 price increase is permanent and
results from the repurchase of equity claims on NAV at a discounted price. No reference is made to
management's informational advantage and ability to time market activity. PRS assert that the OMRs of
industrial firms should exhibit the same relationship between the expected increase in the stock price,
the discount, and the percentage of shares to be repurchased, and thus the same capture of the discount.
Id. at 259. This assertion should be deemed controversial. Discount theory is not orthodox financial
economics-nor even financial economics as modified by behavioral psychology. Outside of the pricing
of closed-end funds, it appears prominently only in explanations of the large premiums acquiring firms
pay in the market for corporate control. Kraakman, supra, at 920-25. When a purchaser buys up an
entire firm it must make up the discount from intrinsic value in order to persuade the shareholders to
sell. The question for OMRs outside of the world of closed-end funds is whether the discount implies
value added on a buyback of 3% to 10% of the stock, with no change of control. One suspects that most
would object to PRS's claim. But it nonetheless should remain on the table as a piece of the larger
explanatory picture.
169. Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 17.
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The option's value transfers wealth to long-term holders from liquidity traders
(who are likely to be short-term holders). The post-announcement stock price
increase reflects the option's value. Because the OMR program creates an
opportunity to buy undervalued stock in the future, the program announcement
causes an uptick in the stock price whether or not the stock is undervalued on
the announcement date. 170 The option's value (like that of all options) derives in
part from the stock's volatility and the number of shares covered. The potential
for future mispricing also figures in. 17 1 Ikenberry and Vermaelen back up their
description by showing that the post-announcement stock price increase is
higher for high-volatility firms than for low-volatility firms. 1
72
But how can management make money for long-term holders by creating and
exercising the option if the stock price immediately rises to account for its
creation? The proponents answer that the market takes a skeptical position
respecting the program's actual future execution, there being no credible commit-
ment. The price corrects upward over time to the extent that management in fact
executes the program. For proof, Ikenberry and Vermaelen compare a portfolio
of OMR stocks in the post-announcement period with a series of control
portfolios. The OMR portfolio, put together from data for the period 1980 to
1990, has an average buy-and-hold return of 12% above the controls. 1
73
Ikenberry and Vermaelen's empirical result does not close the discussion,
however. To sort 1980s portfolios in accordance with the constituent firms'
payout practice is to create a high risk of selection bias. Cash payouts were a
big issue in those days. Firms that got ahead of the curve and stepped up their
payouts (increasing their debt-equity ratios and perhaps avoiding hostile restruc-
turing) were likely to have been rewarded by the market. No inference of
trading expertise necessarily arises.
But additional questions do arise. If traders in the market assume that the
OMR firm will exploit its informational advantage, bid-ask spreads for OMR
stocks should increase whenever traders sense that the firm is in the market on
the buy side. Microstructure models of stock markets assert that this happens
whenever informed traders enter the market. 174 Such an effect could negate
management's ability to repurchase at an attractive price. In addition, the firm's
cost of equity capital could rise to reflect uninformed investors' expected loss
(in addition to the rest of the risk carried by the business). Such an increase in
the capitalization rate could lower the value of the firm, once again negating the
informational advantage.' 75 A price survey for the period 1970 to 1978 shows
170. Id. at 10-11.
171. Id. at 11.
172. Id. at 11-12. Ikenberry and Vermaelen studied 892 OMRs between 1980 and 1990 and
discovered a 7.13% uptick for high-volatility stocks and 2.28% uptick for low-volatility stocks.
173. See Ikenberry et al., supra note 78, at 183-84.
174. See Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 17, at 13.
175. See Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Corporate Payout Policy: Cash Dividends
Versus Open-Market Repurchases, 22 J. FIN. EcON. 61, 63 (1988).
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the predicted increase in bid-ask spreads. But studies for the late 1980s and
1990s either show no increase' 76 or a slight decrease,' 77 the latter result being
consistent with the proposition that issuer repurchase activity can import liquid-
ity to a down market. The differing results could reflect the introduction in 1982
of Rule lOb-18, with its system of trading restrictions. The rule's trading
restrictions 178 handicap the OMR firm in ways the market microstructure
models do not contemplate and so could account for the stability of the bid-ask
spreads in more recent periods. 7 9
B. REGULATION
If the Rule lOb-18 trading restrictions so constrain the OMR firm's trading
activities as to counteract the usual market response to informed trading, then
might they not also prevent the firm from beating the market systematically?
The consistent price uptick of 3% during an OMR announcement period
suggests otherwise, provided we ascribe it to option value and reject the
signaling explanation. But a second question arises immediately: Might we see
different announcement period results under a stricter regulatory regime? Prior
to 2004, neither the federal securities laws nor the stock exchange rules required
ongoing disclosure of purchases under OMR programs. OMR firms took advan-
tage of this blackout and moved by stealth. In a sample of fifty-four firms, these
firms waited an average of seventeen days after an OMR announcement before
buying any stock, minimizing the cost of the post-announcement uptick,180 and
they only executed trades on about one-third of the available trading days
during the life of the program. 8 ' Beginning in 2004, the SEC required firms to
report their repurchases on a quantity basis. 182 The periodic and ex-post charac-
ter of this disclosure requirement leaves open considerable room for stealth.
OMR regulation under the federal securities laws otherwise focuses on the
risk that issuer repurchases could distort the demand side and artificially raise
the stock price. Section 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act prohibits activity "creating
actual or apparent active trading" in a security "or raising or depressing the
price... for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale.., by others."'183 This
vaguely phrased directive is widely understood to open a zone-of-compliance
176. See Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 17, at 13.
177. Cook et al., supra note 165, at 4-6, 22-23.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 186-89.
179. See Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 17, at 13.
180. Douglas 0. Cook et al., An Analysis of SEC Guidelines for Executing Open Market Repur-
chases, 76 J. Bus. 289, 295 (2003).
181. Id.
182. See supra note 87.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2000). SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,692 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1966), appears to be the single enforcement action.
The SEC charged that Georgia-Pacific used OMRs to manipulate its price upwards so as to reduce the
number of its shares distributed in connection with upcoming acquisitions. The company was enjoined
from repurchasing stock while the terms of acquisitions were under determination.
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risk for repurchasing firms even as it has not been read to erect a flat prohibi-
tion. Unfortunately, no case law has arisen to fill in a set of clear instructions.
OMR firms deal with the problem in practice by making formal program
announcements, which are thought to minimize the likelihood of a violation of
the section. The SEC's Rule l0b-18 holds out more comfort still, providing an
optional safe harbor for OMR firms that adhere to the rule's trading restric-
tions. 184 The rule constrains repurchase executions on a day-to-day basis: Only
one broker may be used per day;1 85 the issuer may not make the opening
transaction, and purchases must cease ten to thirty minutes before the close,
depending on the depth of the market in the stock; 186 no purchase price may
exceed the greater of the highest independent published bid and the last
independent sale price;"' and purchases may not exceed 25% of daily trading
volume. 
88
Evidence respecting OMR practice under the safe harbor is scant because
day-to-day disclosure of results is not required. This regulatory gap followed
from wisdom in circulation at the time of the safe harbor's adoption. The idea
was that limits on volume, price, and timing would so reduce the materiality of
OMR activity as to obviate the need for ex-post disclosure of purchases.1
8 9
Since 2004, issuers have been required to make quarterly reports; prior to 2004
many issuers voluntarily reported annual repurchase totals on their form 10-
Ks.' 90 Even so, economists conducting pricing studies have been forced to rely
on overinclusive reporting sources like the cash flow statement and the treasury
stock account. '91
184. Section 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2003), was added to the 1934 Act in 1968
to give the SEC authority to draft comprehensive rules governing repurchases. The SEC introduced a
number of unadopted proposals during the fifteen years following the section's adoption. For a history,
see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,222, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,
669 (Oct. 17, 1980). Rule 1Ob-18, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-18 (2004), adopted in 1982, is not pursuant to
Section 13(e) and instead was intended to "offer guidance" respecting the application of Rule 1Ob-5 and
Section 9(a)(2). See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,244, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83, 276, at 85, 478 (Nov. 17, 1982).
185. Rule 1Ob-18(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-18(b)(1) (2004).
186. Rule lOb-18(b)(2), 17 C.ER. § 240.10b-18(b)(2) (2004).
187. Rule 1Ob-18(b)(3)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b)(3)(i) (2004).
188. There is an exception allowing one block purchase per week, provided the issuer makes no
other purchases on the day of the block trade. Rule 10b-18(b)(4)(i), 17 C.FR. § 240.10b-18(b)(4)(i)
(2004).
189. See Cook et al., supra note 180, at 293 (citing Martin Lipton, Corporate Repurchases:
Disclosure Requirements, Certain Accounting Considerations, in CORPORATE STOCK REPURCASEs 249
(J.H. Flor ed., 1974)); see also Exchange Act Release No. 19,244, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,276, at 85,478 (Nov. 17, 1982) (asserting that issuers rarely undertake repurchase
programs with improper intent).
190. See supra note 87; Jagannathan et al., supra note 12, at 359 n.6, reports that in 1995, 75% of
issuers made these reports, while in 1992 almost no issuers made these reports.
191. See Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 116, at 318, for a list of sources. The statement of cash
flows has set out the value of repurchases since 1984, but the figure includes all redemptions and
retirements of equity securities in addition to OMR transaction outflows. Jagannathan, supra note 12, at
359-60.
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The enforcement process has not yielded a more particular picture of OMR
practice either. If we put Rule 1Ob-5 to one side, there have been no enforce-
ment proceedings to enforce the federal securities laws against OMR issuers
since Rule lOb-18's promulgation. 92 But a study of day-to-day trading activity,
drawn from evidence supplied by a class of volunteer respondent firms,
19 3
provides a picture to fill in the gap. This shows that OMR activity decreases
around firm-specific information announcements,194 implying that the prospect
of insider trading liability operates as an independent constraint. It also shows
that the lOb-18 safe harbor is widely but not slavishly utilized. Forty-one
percent of the firms surveyed exceeded the volume limits on at least one
occasion. 95 The trades in the sample exceeded the pricing and timing limits
around 25% of the time. 196 Issuers apparently do this in pursuit of bargains. On
trading days in compliance, negative abnormal returns for the stock are minus
10 basis points; on days not in compliance, they are minus 22 basis points.
97
Since the rule cautions that noncomplying trades should not be presumed to
violate either Rule lob-5 or Section 9(a)(2),' 98 the report of noncomplying
trades need not signal a cognizable compliance problem.
The question is whether we would be better off with a stricter rule. The
London Stock Exchange's listing rules impose additional restrictions. These
broaden the time reference of the trading constraint, blocking repurchases at a
price greater than 5% above the average market value of the stock during the
antecedent ten business days. They also impose long blackout periods: two
months before annual earnings reports and one month before quarterly reports.
Finally, trading results have to be disclosed almost immediately. 99 This makes
it difficult to take advantage of an undervalued stock price. Post-announcement
192. See BARBARA BLACK, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS AND STOCK REPURCHASES § 6:103 (2003) (indicating
that courts have been disinclined to enforce federal securities laws against OMR issuers due to a
recognition that corporations will to some degree always have greater insider knowledge than sharehold-
ers); see also Brody v. Transitional Hosps. Corp., 280 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a
company's press release concerning its open-market repurchase program does not violate Rule lOb-5 by
failing to disclose certain relevant information unless it also contains misleading statements); Jesse M.
Fried, Open Market Repurchases: Signaling or Managerial Opportunism?, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
865, 883 (2001) (arguing that in many cases enforcement proceedings against OMR issuers cannot be
pursued due to understaffing within the SEC and the stringent requirements that must be met to prove a
violation of Rule IOb-5).
193. Cook et al., supra note 165; Cook et al., supra note 180.
194. Cook et al., supra note 165, at 22-23.
195. Cook et al., supra note 180, at 298.
196. Id. at 304.
197. Id. at 307.
198. Rule lOb-18(d), 17 C.FR. § 240.10b-18(d) (2004).
199. See Rau & Vermaelen, supra note 19, at 250-51 (2002). The Hong Kong exchange works
similarly, adding a requirement of annual shareholder approval. See Hua Zhang, Share Price Perfor-
mance Following Actual Shares Repurchase, EFMA 2003 HELSINKI MEETINGS, available at http://ssm.coml
abstract= 392604. Canada requires monthly reports. Canadian results mirror those yielded in the US.
See David L. Ikenberry et al., Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading, 55 J.
FIN. 2373, 2375 (2000).
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excess returns for firms conducting OMRs on the London Stock Exchange are
only 1.14%-one-third of the U.S. amount.2°°
The U.K.-U.S. comparison suggests that federal securities law figures impor-
tantly in the bargain repurchase story. Even as the insider trading prohibition
contains bargain repurchases, nonviolative bargain repurchases may still occur.
Their incidence would have been much reduced had the SEC taken the occasion
of the enactment of 1934 Act Section 13(e) to require daily trading reports.
Such reports tip the traders to the issuer's presence in the market and thereby
trigger upward adjustments in the stock price in response to OMR executions.
The policy question is whether the leveling effect of transparency enhances the
quality of the marketplace. The argument favoring stricter regulation takes the
equal-information policy behind Rule 10b-5 and Regulation FD20 ' and carries it
out an additional step. But two points of distinction should be noted. First,
assuming that OMR issuers respect Rule lOb-5,2 °2 we are talking only about
market information and nickels and dimes. Second, the beneficiaries in this case
are neither insiders nor favored market intermediaries. They are instead the
OMR firm's nonselling shareholders-the long-term investors so often held out
as the regulatory system's ultimate clients. A movement toward reform seems
unlikely, given the beneficiaries of the status quo. At the same time, a note of
contradiction enters into the case for OMRs. Some of the advantage over
dividends derives from the fact that OMR executions proceed by stealth. It
follows that some of the advantage would disappear if market regulations
brought transparency to issuer trades. Jesse Fried makes a forceful case for just
such a reform in a current article, suggesting that firms be required to disclose
their purchase orders before execution by their brokers.2 °3 I second Professor
Fried's recommendation.
C. ADVERSE SELECTION-THE OVERPRICED REPURCHASE
Even as OMR proponents cite bargain repurchases and show some evidence,
nothing guarantees that OMR firms always make bargain repurchases. Adverse
selection is a constant possibility in a skewed stock market. When an OMR firm
buys overpriced stock, it benefits the selling shareholders to the detriment of
200. See Rau & Vermaelen, supra note 19, at 273-74. London Stock Exchange OMR firms show no
significant gains in their stock prices during the year after the announcement. Id. at 277.
201. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2004).
202. The assumption is not entirely safe. See Jesse M. Fried, Share Repurchase and Managerial
Opportunism, 93 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564682
(showing that inside/outside information asymmetries make for insider trading opportunities that the
securities laws overlook); see also Fried, supra note 14 (arguing that an OMR is less likely to be used
for insider trading purposes than is an RTO, as evidenced by the higher insider ownership in companies
instituting RTOs relative to those instituting OMRs); Song, supra note 76, at 469-71 (conceding the
possibility of the relative unattractiveness of OMRs as compared to RTOs for insider trading purposes
but positing that because insider trading is so difficult to detect in OMRs it may occur more frequently
than is commonly thought).
203. Fried, Share Repurchase and Managerial Opportunism, supra note 202, at 62-72.
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long-term holders. It follows that a firm's choice between dividends and repur-
chases can impact shareholders differently depending, first, on their holding
periods, and second, on whether they are well informed or uninformed.
1. Benefiting the Short-Termer at the Expense of the Long-Termer
Looking forward from the time the firm makes the choice, consider first the
class of shareholders who plan to sell in the period covered by possible OMR
repurchases. The choice of the OMR unequivocally benefits these holders. They
want the highest price possible as soon as possible and benefit from the price
increase triggered by the OMR announcement. 204 A dividend increase serves
them less well. The immediate price uptick is smaller, the cash amount is
smaller, and those who sell soonest may miss the record date and the distribu-
tion.
Next consider a hypothetical shareholder who, during the OMR period, plans
to sell a portion of her holding equal to the proportion of shares to be
repurchased in an OMR program. This pro rata posture shields the holder from
either benefit or injury due to the post-announcement price increase. Given a tax
differential favoring capital gains, this holder strictly prefers a higher proportion
of repurchases: The greater the proportion, the greater the tax savings.2" 5 Given
tax-rate parity, this holder is indifferent to the choice between dividend and
repurchase (assuming the holder does not look to a repurchase program to
generate gains to net against unrelated capital losses).
Finally, consider a third class of shareholder, the long-term holder. This
holder does not plan to sell during the period covered by an OMR. Assume for
the moment that the market price is allocatively efficient, that is, that the market
price of the stock equals its intrinsic value. The long-term holder emerges in the
same position as the pro rata seller. If the tax system offers a lower rate for
capital gains, this holder will disfavor dividends. The OMR program, mean-
while, holds out an added benefit due to the pro rata increase in the holder's
share of the firm's value.2 ° 6 If we introduce rate parity between capital gains
and dividends, this holder still benefits from the tax deferral held out by the
repurchase,20 7 but he or she is otherwise indifferent between dividends and
repurchases under allocatively efficient pricing.
Results change when we drop the assumption of allocatively efficient market
prices. Assume instead that the uptick in the market price in the wake of an
OMR announcement causes the stock price to rise above the firm's intrinsic
value. Now the OMR purchases are dilutive-the value of the nonselling
holder's increased proportionate ownership is less than the pro rata cost of the
204. See Deborah J. Lucas & Robert L. MacDonald, Shareholder Heterogeneity, Adverse Selection,
and Payout Policy, 33 J. FrN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 233, 238-41 (1998).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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outflow to the selling shareholders. Given tax rates favoring capital gains, the
long-term holder's preference will follow from a cost-benefit calculation: If the
tax saving from the foregone dividend is greater than the cost of dilution, the
holder is benefited; if the dilution exceeds the tax benefit, the holder is injured.
This cost-benefit reckoning changes under rate parity: If the cost of dilution
exceeds the tax benefit of the deferral, the repurchase of overpriced stock
clearly injures the holder. The chance of injury increases accordingly.
The move to rate parity therefore complicates the posture of the long-term
holder, the holder whose interest arguably should determine management's
choice between dividends and repurchases. All other things being equal, this
holder is benefited by repurchases of underpriced stock; repurchases of over-
priced stock hold out a potential for injury. Under the tax regime favoring
capital gains, assuming a 50-50 chance of over- or underpriced repurchases, the
long-term holder's interest clearly lies with repurchases, due to the tax advan-
tage. Under rate parity, assuming the same 50-50 posture and putting the value
of deferral to one side, we arguably get the opposite result. We have a classic
even-odds coin flip on which the risk-averse actor declines to stake significant
sums absent compensation. The dividend, which carries no risk of injury, now
trumps the repurchase. But the picture regains its complication when we put the
value of tax deferral back on the table. Now the holder's choice depends on
whether the deferral's value compensates for the downside risk of repurchase of
overvalued stock.
It plausibly can be argued that the real-world odds are stacked in favor of
repurchases. Given management's informational advantage, the stock is likely
to be undervalued. If we put the informational advantage together with- the tax
deferral, the balance presumptively still falls in favor of repurchases. But to stop
here, at the level of presumption, is to miss the governance implications of rate
parity. Before 2003, the rate differential meant that adverse selection was a
theoretical problem without real-world implications. The long-term holder would
be hurt only if the OMR brought in significant amounts of overvalued stock.
Given that OMR programs tend to cover significantly less than 10% of the stock
outstanding and that there is no evidence of significant insider selling activity at
OMR firms, there was no cognizable governance problem. Serious discussion of
adverse selection problems accordingly has been limited to the RTOs of the late
1980s, which involved large blocks of stock, clear-cut premiums over the
market price, and, in many cases, significant insider selling activity.
20 8
With rate parity, adverse selection becomes a more active possibility respect-
ing OMR programs. The presumptive informational advantage does not negate
the possibility of dilution due to overpriced repurchases. Managers make only a
modest claim when they say they beat the market as they conduct OMRs. 20 9
208. See, e.g., Michael J. Brennan & Anjan V. Thakor, Shareholder Preferences and Dividend
Policy, 40J. FIN. 993, 996, 1001 (1990).
209. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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This is because a portion of the value of the information advantage is trans-
ferred directly into the pockets of the selling shareholders by the post-
announcement price uptick. The advantage remaining is that of a trader in a
single stock playing into short-term price volatility. The long-term holder
certainly will be glad to benefit from the nickels and dimes the trading gener-
ates. But this holder also cares whether management is astute enough to buy
only when intrinsic value is greater than market price, viewed from a long-term
perspective. Some managers may have that acuity some of the time. But many
managers who conducted OMRs in the hot stock market of the later 1990s
presumably did not. It bears noting that the financial economic study most
supportive of the presumption that management can beat the market-
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen's finding of a three-year performance
advantage of OMR firms over the market as a whole--covers the period
1980_1990.2 ° Those were the days when OMRs implied restructuring, and
firms that restructured successfully saw substantial intermediate-term increases
in equity value. Things will look different in other periods. The next generation
of empirical studies-studies covering the long-term value implications of
OMRs after 1996-are likely to put things in a different posture, due to
historically high repurchase prices.
2. Benefiting the Informed Holder at the Expense of Uninformed Holders
Let us return to the question of how the dividend/repurchase decision impacts
different groups of shareholders and change assumptions. This time we have
three groups-one group has a long-term holding horizon, the second group
plans to sell presently, and a third group lacks a fixed time horizon. The OMR
announcement is material information for holders in the third group. If the firm
will be buying in an overvalued market, the signal is to sell. If the firm will be
buying in an undervalued market, the signal is to hold. The announcement poses
a choice. The holders either incur the cost of informing themselves as to the
stock's price/value posture or they run the risk of partial expropriation through
the trading activity of better-informed investors. If we assume a fixed cost of
information acquisition, then the OMR program benefits larger investors. Be-
cause they hold larger blocks of stock, the per-share cost of becoming informed
is lower.21 One suspects a perception of this structural advantage informs
management's assumption that institutional holders prefer repurchases to divi-
dends.21 2 Dividends, meanwhile, create no relative advantages within the group
of shareholders.
2 1 3
The point that large shareholders have structural advantages respecting trad-
ing decisions is not news. What is new is that under the prior tax regime the
210. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
211. Brennan & Thakor, supra note 208, at 995.
212. See supra text accompanying note 61.
213. See Baker et al., supra note 38, at 253-54
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advantage made no difference for OMR programs because repurchases ben-
efited most shareholders, whether or not well informed, almost all of the time.
That assumption no longer is safe. Now that the OMR tax advantage is modest,
there arises a cognizable risk of injury to long-term shareholders due to repur-
chases of overvalued stock. Payout decisions that formerly implicated no
tradeoffs now implicate complex risk assessments, at least in theory. Whether
they will be treated as such in practice is an open question.
D. SUMMARY
To the extent management can use its informational advantage or trading
acuity to beat the market on a day-to-day basis, the case for repurchase over
dividend for long-term shareholders is enhanced. The advantage operates only
in the short-term context of day-to-day volatility, for at some point the market
perceives the repurchase activity and bids up the price. The moment of percep-
tion would be sooner and the trading advantage smaller if the securities laws
imposed daily reporting duties on OMR firms. Even absent such regulation, the
trading advantage holds out no free lunch to the long-term holder, because it
does nothing to assure against repurchases in overvalued markets, the possibil-
ity of which increases as stock options loom larger in the motivational picture.
V. GOVERNANCE
Economic theory posits irrelevance for payout decisions. In an ideal world in
which managers never self-serve and all shareholders are fully informed, the
choice between dividends and repurchases implicates neither gain nor loss. But,
in the second-best world we inhabit, the decision as to the mode of payout
implies cost-benefit tradeoffs.
A number of these cost-benefit factors figured into the historical shift from
dividends to repurchases. Tax certainly must be mentioned, but not because
managers altruistically shape payout policy to minimize shareholder tax liabili-
ties. Rather, the tax bias favoring repurchases caused actors in the investment
community to favor the change, effectively expanding the zone of management
discretion. The normative drift to shareholder-value maximization had a similar
effect.214 The shareholder-oriented mindset of the 1990s was shaped during the
investor revolt of the 1980s against suboptimal reinvestment of marginal dollars
by managers. The restructuring battles of the 1980s succeeded in disrupting
management's habit of reflexive investment in poor projects. But shareholders,
still wary of a management bias toward reinvestment, welcomed any transfer of
cash out of the firm. With payout assured and suboptimal investment avoided,
shareholders asked no further questions about the mode of payout chosen. The
214. Baker & Wurgler, supra note 67, at 1132-47, show statistical evidence of a shift of shareholder
preferences away from dividends beginning in 1978. In their explanation, the operative shareholder
preference is for value-enhancing reinvestment rather than payout. The discussion here assumes this
preference.
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door was open for managers to shift a portion of the total payout to repurchases
in lockstep with their desire to obscure the costs of their stock option exercises.
Regulatory developments also figured into the change. The SEC opened its door
to repurchases in 1982 by promulgating the Rule lOb-18 safe harbor for OMRs.
Like shareholders, it then stopped asking questions.
How do the costs and benefits of different payout methods compare today? If
we put taxation to one side for the moment, the case in favor of repurchases
rests on two points. First, the flexibility of OMR programs facilitates the
disgorgement of free cash flows that otherwise might be retained suboptimally.
Second, firms can beat the market in their own shares and purchase undervalued
stock. But the stock option overlay triggers questions about both claimed
advantages. Although OMRs are flexible, it must be questioned whether, absent
side benefits to management, their availability alone assures payout of free cash
flows. If we answer the question in the negative, we get the counterfactual
suggestion that the overall payout rate in recent years would have been lower
absent stock options.
Similar questions arise for the bargain repurchase assertion. Managers hold-
ing stock options have every reason to execute repurchases at advantageous
prices. But to the extent that earnings management determines the amount of
cash devoted to repurchases from quarter to quarter, there is less reason to
assume purchase price acuity. If the quarterly earnings per share calculation
signals for repurchases, the OMR program presumably proceeds even in a
market that is at a cyclical high point. Stock option economics compound the
problem: The dilutive effect of an exercise of stock options increases with the
market price. Increased dilution signals more repurchases to protect earnings
per share, whether or not the market is overpriced.21 5 To be sure, officers
executing an OMR program in such a market will still endeavor to trade at
times when the price falls to the low end of the current range. But on average,
repurchases under such conditions will not both provide an advantage to
long-term shareholders and improve the earnings per share.
One point emerges, regardless of how payout policy might have developed in
the 1990s absent the stock option bonanza: The shift to repurchases should not
be read as a governance success story. Because repurchases held out tax benefits
to most shareholders, there was no reason for outside monitors to ask hard
questions about flexibility and adverse selection nor to inquire about the motiva-
tional effects of stock option valuation on earnings management. With tax-rate
parity, the governance system needs to start the questioning process.216
Once shareholders and outside commentators have asked these questions, the
special dividend emerges as a viable answer. The shareholders of a firm that
215. See WEISBENNER, supra note 127, at 16 (showing that a 5% increase in stock options outstanding
means a 0.4% increase in the fraction of shares repurchased and that the link is strongest with a rising
stock price).
216. Cf. LEASE ET AL., supra note 14, at 2-4, 179-91 (confirming the importance of dividend policy
decisions).
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diverts its surplus profits into special dividends instead of repurchases get three
benefits. First, the shareholders no longer bear an adverse-selection risk with
respect to the prices paid for repurchased shares. Second, they get the benefit of
transparency with respect to the dilution cost of managers' stock options. And
third, they receive more meaningful reports of earnings per share. But they also
incur two costs. First, they lose the benefit of management's short-term market
trading advantage. Second, the tax system returns to the picture, and taxpaying
shareholders lose the ability to defer taxes on sums paid out. If the adverse-
selection and trading-advantage possibilities cancel each other out, then the
matter comes down to a trade-off between transparency and tax deferral. The
outcome of this trade-off is unclear, but the point to note is that transparency has
a value. Wider appreciation of the costs of equity compensation schemes could
beneficially affect boardroom judgments respecting compensation, holding out
the possible dollars-and-cents benefit of a decrease in management compensa-
tion.
Thus, we return to the corporate governance system with a cost-benefit
question on the table. The trade-offs have to be considered case by case. A
series of qualitative assessments comes to bear on each firm's managers,
investment opportunities, incentive pay structure, and stock price. Is the gover-
nance system constituted so that the issue will be joined?
At present, the answer is probably no: the system will likely let the matter
pass. The payout decision lies in the ultimate redoubt of managment discretion,
at least as a question of corporate law. 217 And, as we have seen, corporations
tend in practice to back into their dividend and repurchase decisions. Spare cash
for distribution comes to the table by a process of deduction. The business plan,
new investments, and liquidity take first priority. The dividend payout comes
next, with aversion to present or future dividend cuts constraining the zone of
discretion. Cash for OMRs is released at the final step.218 The deductive
sequence leaves the board of directors in the traditional rubber-stamp position.
Management has no incentive to institute a review of the basic assumptions,
especially because of the convenient linkage between OMRs and stock option
value. Nor should we look to outside directors to make disruptive suggestions.
Despite the linkage to stock options, not one decision in the sequence falls into
the emerging category of subjects reserved for separate examination by indepen-
dent directors: auditor approval,219 board nominations,22 ° and executive compen-
sation.221 As to the last, shareholder approval is emerging as the norm for all
217. Business judgment treatment obtains, so long as management observes the formality of never
publicly stating that the pursuit of private benefits really motivates its policy. See Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 170 N.W. 668, 680 (Mich. 1919).
218. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
219. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 301-02, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-l(m), 7241 (West. Supp. 2004).
220. See NYSE Corporate Governance Rule Proposals § 4(a) (Aug. 1, 2002).
221. Id. § 5(a).
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equity compensation schemes.2 22 Yet the SEC has traditionally blocked share-
holder input on dividend and repurchase decisions.223
The federal securities laws aid and abet the system by enveloping payout
policy in black boxes. OMR program execution implicates ongoing reporting
only on an ex-post, quarterly basis.224 Indeed, prior to 2004, firms were not
even required to break out totals, even on an annual basis.225 Dividends
declared and paid have always been public information, of course. But nondisclo-
sure otherwise still tends to be the rule for decisions respecting payout and
reinvestment. Warren Buffett comments as follows on management communica-
tions respecting dividend and reinvestment decisions:
Dividend policy is often reported to shareholders, but seldom explained. A
company will say something like, "Our goal is to pay out 40% to 50% of
earnings and to increase dividends at a rate at least equal to the rise in the
CPI." And that's it-no analysis will be supplied as to why that particular
policy is best for the owners of the business. Yet allocation of capital is crucial
to business and investment management.226
Buffett's comment is descriptive of practice under the mandatory disclosure
system, which has never mandated meaningful disclosure of dividend and
reinvestment decisions.227 A disclosure regime more skeptical of the incentives
222. Id. § 8.
223. The block lies in Rule 14a-8(I)(13), 17 C.FR. § 240.14a-8(I)(13) (2004), which permits
omission of proposals relating to "specific amounts of cash or stock dividends." Shareholders can get
around the block by being general. For example, the SEC has refused a no-action letter respecting a
proposal that a company start paying a quarterly dividend. Martin Lawrence Ltd. Editions, Inc., Letter
Refusing SEC No-Action Request, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 637 (Apr. 11, 1990). Historically, the
SEC has granted no-action letters against proposals requesting that funds for dividends be shifted over
to repurchases. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 341 (Mar. 6, 2001) (granting no-action letter respecting amendment expanding stock repurchase
program and suspending dividends). But the record is inconsistent. See Hydron Technologies, Inc.,
Letter Refusing SEC No-Action Request, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 578 (May 8, 1997) (refusing
no-action on a proposal that all funds for dividends be shifted to repurchases if cast as a recommenda-
tion for the board of directors).
224. See supra note 87.
225. See id.
226. Warren E. Buffett, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 5, 123 (1997).
227. SEC disclosure requirements pertaining to the payment and declaration of dividends are very
general. Regulation S-X requires the registrant to disclose the amount of the dividends for each class of
share, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-04 (2004), and further requires that any restrictions on dividend payments be
noted in the notes accompanying financial statements, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-08(e)(1) (2004). No other
significant information respecting dividends needs to be reported in periodic financials filed with the
SEC. See generally Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (2004). Regulation S-K requires the
registrant to disclose cash dividends declared per common share in its selected financial data and
permits the disclosure of any other additional items that the registrant believes would enhance an
understanding of other trends in its financial condition. 17 C.F.R. § 229.301(b)(2) (2004).
There are reasons for this. In the rare case where a manager makes a disclosure about a dividend or
reinvestment decision, the statement amounts to cheap talk because the decisions' bases are unobserv-
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driving payout and reinvestment decisions would require firms to identify the
different investment projects adopted and funded in a given period and state the
amount invested.228 Unfortunately, such a rule would entail a systemic over-
haul.
A lesser level of transparency keyed to the mode of payout could be achieved
without root-and-branch reform. Here we put investment policy to one side and
concentrate on enhanced transparency and responsiveness respecting choice
between OMRs and dividends. OMRs, like stock options, can be reviewed by
independent directors and sent to the shareholders for annual ratification.229 The
accompanying proxy statements can set out the record of past repurchases and
their correlation with stock option exercises. These added disclosures could
move payout policy to a higher place on the board's agenda, triggering confron-
tation with attendant cost-benefit questions.
At a minimum, boards should look carefully at the market before their firms
buy back stock and should monitor the market while programs are being
executed. They also should pay attention to the trading behavior of the officers
they monitor. If the officers are selling the firm's stock, then the firm should not
be buying it. And if some officer sales should be put down to benign purposes-
for example, sales for the purpose of diversifying an officer's personal portfolio-
then the benign number of sales per period can and should be stated in advance.
CONCLUSION
The traditional dividend puzzle is a theoretical search for a rational explana-
tion for shareholders' anomalous preference for dividends. It has never been
able. Smart money looks for signals with more credibility. For the rest of the explanation, we can look
to the SEC's early tradition of limiting the disclosure mandate to hard, verifiable information, see
George G. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECuRIEs 23, 26-30 (Henry Manne ed., 1969),
and its more recent problems in constructing a viable safe harbor for projections disclosure, see Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2000) (inserting new section 27A
into the Securities Act of 1933 with a safe harbor for forward-looking statements). Reinvestment
decisions are made to finance investments, and investments follow from projections. Mandated
disclosure of particulars respecting reinvestment decisions thus sounds suspiciously like a mandate to
disclose internal projections.
Stepped-up disclosure rules have been suggested in the legal literature as a device for delimiting
management discretion over the dividend. But, in making this argument, Victor Brudney rejected a
requirement of detailed disclosure of the components underlying each dividend decision-"a dubious
benefit, and at a likely intolerable cost." Brudney, supra note 98, at 116-17. He instead recommended
that alterations in longer-term payout patterns be announced and explained. He sought, by reference to
the signaling literature, to deploy the disclosure mandate to clear up the ambiguities that attend
departure from (or adherence to) the conventional payout pattern. He placed primary emphasis on the
dividend decision's apparent capacity to influence the stock price, independent of the reinvestment
decision. Id. at 117-22. He acknowledged that his proposed disclosure rule might also constrain
management's self-interested tendencies respecting reinvestment, but only as an incidental benefit. Id.
at 122.
228. See Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and
Economic Inefficiencies, 85 Am. ECON. REv. 1301 (1995).
229. This is the practice in Hong Kong. See supra note 199.
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solved to the satisfaction of the financial economics community. With tax parity
under the JGTRRA, we get a new, real-world dividend puzzle posed in the
boardrooms of firms with free cash flow. Up to now, boards have avoided
confrontation with the cost-benefit questions now posed by the choice between
dividends and repurchases, leaving the matter in the black box of management
discretion. Passivity seemed plausible, given the tax advantages of repurchases.
Now that the JGTRRA has evened the tax balance, this lax governance posture
is no longer defensible. Independent directors now must intervene in payout
decisions, informing themselves about the costs as well as the benefits of
repurchases. Each of the market and timing management incentives should be
monitored on an ongoing basis. Transparent financial reports should be insisted
on.

